Insurer pricing and consumer welfare: evidence from Medigap
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article examines the welfare impact of imperfect competition in the Medicare supplement insurance (Medigap) market. Two firms control nearly three fourths of the Medigap market, and premiums exceed claims by over 25%. I find that a low price elasticity and consumers' brand preferences lead firms to engage in substantial marketing and price above cost. Therefore, the strategic behavior of insurers facing relatively inelastic demand is critical in explaining poor market performance. I also find that insurers do not capture all of the rents in this market; rents also accrue to actors who perform marketing functions, including agents and brokers.
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Citations
Cites
When choice is demotivating: can one desire too much of a good thing?
Iyengar, S. S., & Lepper, M. R. (2000) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.79.6.995 · Cited by 2,878
Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets
Chiappori, P., & Salanie, B. (2000) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262111 · Cited by 1,013
Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice
Cohen, A., & Einav, L. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.3.745 · Cited by 708
Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts
Handel, B. R. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.7.2643 · Cited by 707
Asymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey
Cardon, J. H., & Hendel, I. (2001) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2696362 · Cited by 411 · cited 5×
“A number of studies use this framework, and some fail to find evidence of imperfect information (Cawley and Philipson [1999], Cardon and Hendel [2001]). Cutler, Finkelstein, and McGarry [2006] explain these conflicting results as the result of multidimensional consumer characteristics; a consumer with a low risk ex an…”
BackgroundInfluentialPaying a Premium on Your Premium? Consolidation in the US Health Insurance Industry
Dafny, L., Duggan, M., & Ramanarayanan, S. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.2.1161 · Cited by 291
Cited by
Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts
Handel, B. R. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.7.2643 · Cited by 707
Mergers When Prices Are Negotiated: Evidence from the Hospital Industry
Gowrisankaran, G., Nevo, A., & Town, R. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20130223 · Cited by 393
The Industrial Organization of Health-Care Markets
Gaynor, M., Ho, K., & Town, R. J. (2015) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.53.2.235 · Cited by 349
Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition in Lending Markets
Crawford, G. S., Pavanini, N., & Schivardi, F. (2018) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20150487 · Cited by 177
“Following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), we assume that the informational asymmetry in this market concerns the riskiness of the firm. Specifically, conditional on observables, a firm’s riskiness is known by that firm but not by any of the Jmt banks in its market; instead, banks are assumed to know the distribution of ris…”
Influential
Metadata
- Authors
- Starc, A.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2014-03
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 198-220
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- 1756-2171
- OpenAlex
- W2003806748
- Cited by
- 167
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 50.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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