Mapping the Ideological Marketplace

Larger campaign contributions indicate, in part, a stronger ideological match between the candidate and the donor.

“where larger contributions indicate, in part, a stronger ideological match between the candidate and the donor (Bonica 2014; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2016).”

There is a strong consensus among scholars of politics in the USA that liberal and conservative political elites have grown increasingly polarized over the past few decades.

“For example, there is a strong consensus among scholars of politics in the USA that liberal and conservative political elites (including members of Congress, party activists, donors and judicial appointees) have grown increasingly polarized over the past few decades27–34.”

When analyses include voters, they do so at the expense of strong bridging assumptions or only for self-selected population groups.

“When the analysis also includes voters, it is done at the expense of strong”

The assumption behind this model is similar in nature to that justifying how donations and roll call votes can be scaled onto a latent ideological dimension.

“Although obviously less costly than campaign contributions or votes in a legislature, the assumption behind this model is similar in nature to that justifying how donations and roll call votes can be scaled onto a latent ideological dimension (Poole and Rosenthal 2007; Bonica 2014).”

The correlation between ideal points estimated using Twitter networks and contribution records is 0.80.

“The correlation between ideal points estimated using Twitter networks and contribution records (Bonica 2014) is ¼ 0:80.”