The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Electoral Manipulation as Bureaucratic Control
Open accessAbstract
Bureaucratic compliance is often crucial for political survival, yet eliciting that compliance in weakly institutionalized environments requires that political principals convince agents that their hold on power is secure. We provide a formal model to show that electoral manipulation can help to solve this agency problem. By influencing beliefs about a ruler's hold on power, manipulation can encourage a bureaucrat to work on behalf of the ruler when he would not otherwise do so. This result holds under various common technologies of electoral manipulation. Manipulation is more likely when the bureaucrat is dependent on the ruler for his career and when the probability is high that even generally unsupportive citizens would reward bureaucratic effort. The relationship between the ruler's expected popularity and the likelihood of manipulation, in turn, depends on the technology of manipulation.
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Cites
The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217
Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War
Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2010) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511781353 · Cited by 3,459
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms
McCubbins, M. D., & Schwartz, T. (1984) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110792 · Cited by 2,936
Political Institutions under Dictatorship
Gandhi, J. (2008) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510090 · Cited by 1,910
Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats
Gandhi, J., & Przeworski, A. (2007) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414007305817 · Cited by 1,523
The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy
Moe, T. M. (1995) · Organization Theory · doi:10.1093/oso/9780195098303.003.0007 · Cited by 257
Cited by
Guriev, S., & Treisman, D. (2019) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.33.4.100 · Cited by 560
Svolik, M. W. (2020) · Quarterly Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1561/100.00018132 · Cited by 340
Frye, T., Gehlbach, S., Marquardt, K. L., & Reuter, O. J. (2017) · Post-Soviet Affairs · doi:10.1080/1060586x.2016.1144334 · Cited by 297
Self-citationA theory of informational autocracy
Guriev, S., & Treisman, D. (2020) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104158 · Cited by 205
How State Capacity Helps Autocrats win Elections
Seeberg, M. B. (2021) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123419000450 · Cited by 43
Metadata
- Authors
- Gehlbach, S., & Simpser, A.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2014-05-08
- Volume
- 59
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 212-224
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-5907
- OpenAlex
- W2331932723
- Cited by
- 158
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 25.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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