Legislative Veto Players and the Effects of International Human Rights Agreements
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Do national legislatures constitute a mechanism by which commitments to international human rights treaties can be made credible? Treaty ratification can activate domestic mechanisms that make repression more costly, and the legislative opposition can enhance these mechanisms. Legislative veto players raise the cost of formalistic repressive strategies by declining to consent to legislation. Executives can still choose to rely on more costly, extralegal strategies, but these could result in severe penalties for the leader and require the leader to expend resources to hide. Especially in treaty member‐states, legislatures can use other powers to also increase the cost of extralegal violations, which can further reduce repression. By using an empirical strategy that attempts to address the selection effects in treaty commitment decisions, I show that positive effects of human rights treaties increase when there are more legislative veto players.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
International Norm Dynamics and Political Change
Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081898550789 · Cited by 8,292
MatchIt : Nonparametric Preprocessing for Parametric Causal Inference
Ho, D. E., Imai, K., King, G., & Stuart, E. A. (2011) · Journal of Statistical Software · doi:10.18637/jss.v042.i08 · Cited by 4,385 · cited 1×
“In the second stage, I match treaty members to nonmembers using the nearest-neighbor algorithm (in which the distance metric is a propensity score estimated using a logit (function; Ho et al. 2011).”
MethodDoes matching overcome lalonde’s critique of nonexperimental estimators?
A. Smith, J., & E. Todd, P. (2005) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/j.jeconom.2004.04.011 · Cited by 3,176
Amelia II: A Program for Missing Data
Honaker, J., King, G., & Blackwell, M. (2011) · Journal of Statistical Software · doi:10.18637/jss.v045.i07 · Cited by 2,552
Characterizing Selection Bias Using Experimental Data
Heckman, J., Ichimura, H., Smith, J., & Todd, P. (1998) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2999630 · Cited by 2,286
State Repression and Political Order
Davenport, C. (2007) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.101405.143216 · Cited by 1,564
Respect for Human Rights has Improved Over Time: Modeling the Changing Standard of Accountability
FARISS, C. J. (2014) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055414000070 · Cited by 706
Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996
Davenport, C., & Armstrong, D. A. (2004) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00086.x · Cited by 652 · cited 1×
“…more to relatively few violations of human rights in democracies than the “Veto” characteristics of democracy, such as legislatures, the judiciary and constitutional structures (Richards 1999; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2005; Davenport 2007b; Conrad and Moore 2010).”
BackgroundKEEFER, P., & STASAVAGE, D. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000777 · Cited by 636
Davenport, C. (1995) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111650 · Cited by 623
State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace
Davenport, C. (2007) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510021 · Cited by 549
The Repression of Dissent: A Substitution Model of Government Coercion
Moore, W. H. (2000) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002700044001006 · Cited by 361
Cited by
Digital Authoritarianism and the Future of Human Rights
Dragu, T., & Lupu, Y. (2021) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818320000624 · Cited by 134
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Lupu, Y.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2015-02-10
- Volume
- 59
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 578-594
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-5907
- OpenAlex
- W1799705565
- Cited by
- 161
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 29.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.