The DOI matches its Crossref record; 46 of the 46 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials: A Randomized Field Experiment
Open accessAbstract
Concern that donations to political campaigns secure preferential treatment from policy makers has long occupied judges, scholars, and the public. However, the effects of contributions on policy makers’ behavior are notoriously difficult to assess. We present the first randomized field experiment on the topic. The experiment focuses on whether contributions facilitate access to influential policy makers. In the experiment, a political organization attempted to schedule meetings between 191 congressional offices and the organization's members in their districts who were campaign donors. However, the organization randomly assigned whether it revealed to congressional offices that prospective attendees had contributed to campaigns. When informed prospective attendees were political donors, senior policy makers made themselves available between three and four times more often. These findings underscore concerns about the Supreme Court's recent decisions deregulating campaign finance.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America
Schattschneider, E. E. (1960) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 4,262
Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens
Gilens, M., & Page, B. I. (2014) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592714001595 · Cited by 2,700
Unequal democracy: the political economy of the new gilded age
(2008) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-1746 · Cited by 2,314
Field Experiments: Design, Analysis, and Interpretation
Green, D. (2024) · doi:10.61700/sgeirzx0v0mjh1252 · Cited by 1,320
Baumgartner, F. R., Berry, J. M., Hojnacki, M., Leech, B. L., & Kimball, D. C. (2009) · University of Chicago Press · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226039466.001.0001 · Cited by 1,296
Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?
Ansolabehere, S., de Figueiredo, J. M., & Snyder, J. M. (2003) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533003321164976 · Cited by 1,281
Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy
HALL, R. L., & DEARDORFF, A. V. (2006) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055406062010 · Cited by 1,172
The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data
CLINTON, J., JACKMAN, S., & RIVERS, D. (2004) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055404001194 · Cited by 1,153
Yes, but what’s the mechanism? (don’t expect an easy answer).
Bullock, J. G., Green, D. P., & Ha, S. E. (2010) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0018933 · Cited by 1,063
Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America
Gilens, M. (2012) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400844821 · Cited by 981
Cited by
Legislative Staff and Representation in Congress
HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, A., MILDENBERGER, M., & STOKES, L. C. (2019) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055418000606 · Cited by 291
Partisan Interactions: Evidence from a Field Experiment in the United States
Perez-Truglia, R., & Cruces, G. (2017) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/692711 · Cited by 146
How to study democratic backsliding
Druckman, J. N. (2024) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12942 · Cited by 56
Grose, C. R., Lopez, P., Sadhwani, S., & Yoshinaka, A. (2022) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/714923 · Cited by 39
Metadata
- Authors
- Kalla, J. L., & Broockman, D. E.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2015-04-02
- Volume
- 60
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 545-558
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-5907
- OpenAlex
- W2169606246
- Cited by
- 400
- References
- 46
- FWCI
- 41.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials: A Randomized Field Experiment. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/ajps.12180
- The paper
- Kalla, J. L., & Broockman, D. E. (2016). Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials: A Randomized Field Experiment. American Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12180
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.