Partisanship, Economic Assessments, and Presidential Accountability
Abstract
Few issues are more salient for voters or more important in political decision making than economic conditions, and no American public official is more closely associated with the economy than the president. Existing scholarship disagrees, however, about how partisan loyalties affect economic evaluations. We study how partisan control of the presidency affects economic perceptions using eight waves of panel data collected around the 2016 presidential election from a national probability sample. We find that although individual‐level perceptions are largely stable across time, the change in partisan control of the White House was associated with more positive evaluations among Republicans and more negative evaluations among Democrats. These effects are statistically significant yet substantively modest in magnitude. Our results indicate that partisanship is less strongly associated with economic assessments than some previous scholarship has claimed and suggest more sanguine conclusions about the prospects for presidential accountability even in a partisan era.
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Self-identified conservatives are more likely than liberals to exhibit the 'President-in-power' effect, that is, to trust the government more when their own party holds the White House.
“self-identified conservatives are more likely than liberals to exhibit the aforementioned ‘President-in-power’ effect; that is, to trust the government more when their own party (versus the other party) holds the White House161,186,187.”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [186]
Cites
Iyengar, S., Sood, G., & Lelkes, Y. (2012) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfs038 · Cited by 2,748 · see citing works
Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions
Bartels, L. M. (2002) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1023/a:1021226224601 · Cited by 1,468 · see citing works
An Asymmetrical “President-in-Power” Effect
MORISI, D., JOST, J. T., & SINGH, V. (2019) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055418000850 · Cited by 73 · see citing works
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Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts
Jost, J. T., Baldassarri, D. S., & Druckman, J. N. (2022) · Nature Reviews Psychology · doi:10.1038/s44159-022-00093-5 · Cited by 276 · see citing works
- Authors
- Ang, Z., Reeves, A., Rogowski, J. C., & Vishwanath, A.
- Affiliations
- Washington University in St. Louis (US)
- University of Chicago (US)
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Rogowski, Jon C.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2021-09-17
- Volume
- 66
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 468-484
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-5907
- OpenAlex
- W3200658085
- Cited by
- 16
- References
- 3
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 2
- FWCI
- 7.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- American Journal of Political Science (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Politics, Economics, and Education Policy
- Keywords
- partisanship, economic evaluation, presidential accountability, economic perceptions, 2016 US presidential election, public opinion
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