Implicit and explicit false belief development in preschool children
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The ability to represent the mental states of other agents is referred to as Theory of Mind (ToM). A developmental breakthrough in ToM consists of understanding that others can have false beliefs about the world. Recently, infants younger than 2 years of age have been shown to pass novel implicit false belief tasks. However, the processes underlying these tasks and their relation to later‐developing explicit false belief understanding, as well as to other cognitive abilities, are not yet understood. Here, we study a battery of implicit and explicit false belief tasks in 3‐ and 4‐year‐old children, relating their performance to linguistic abilities and executive functions. The present data show a significant developmental change from failing explicit false belief tasks at 3 years of age to passing them at the age of 4, while both age groups pass implicit false belief tasks. This differential developmental trajectory is reflected by the finding that explicit and implicit false belief tasks do not correlate. Further, we demonstrate that explicit false belief tasks correlate with syntactic and executive functions, whereas implicit false belief tasks do not. The study thus indicates that the processes underlying implicit false belief tasks are different from later‐developing explicit false belief understanding. Moreover, our results speak for a critical role of syntactic and executive functions for passing standard explicit false belief tasks in contrast to implicit tasks.
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Citations
Cites
Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind” ?
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8 · Cited by 8,599
Wimmer, H. (1983) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(83)90004-5 · Cited by 6,305
Meta-Analysis of Theory-of-Mind Development: The Truth about False Belief
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00304 · Cited by 4,476 · cited 1×
“For explicit false belief understanding, we found a critical developmental change between our two age groups, in which 3-year-olds performed significantly below chance and 4-year-olds significantly above chance – in line with previous literature (Wellman et al., 2001).”
ResultDo 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs?
Onishi, K. H., & Baillargeon, R. (2005) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1107621 · Cited by 2,350
Developmentally Sensitive Measures of Executive Function in Preschool Children
Carlson, S. M. (2005) · Developmental Neuropsychology · doi:10.1207/s15326942dn2802_3 · Cited by 1,638 · cited 1×
“To test the children’s executive functions, we adapted three tasks from the literature: a Reverse Categorization task (Carlson, 2005), a Go-NoGo task (Rakoczy, 2010), and the standard Delay of Gratification task (Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970).”
MethodDo humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states
Apperly, I. A., & Butterfill, S. A. (2009) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/a0016923 · Cited by 1,261
Milligan, K., Astington, J. W., & Dack, L. A. (2007) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01018.x · Cited by 1,248
Action Anticipation Through Attribution of False Belief by 2-Year-Olds
Southgate, V., Senju, A., & Csibra, G. (2007) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01944.x · Cited by 1,066 · cited 10×
“(2009), for example, neurotypical adults showed similar performance levels (76% correct first looks) to infants for the same task (Southgate et al., 2007).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialFalse-belief understanding in infants
Baillargeon, R., Scott, R. M., & He, Z. (2010) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.12.006 · Cited by 1,030 · cited 6×
“Whereas some argue for developmental continuity of implicit and explicit false belief abilities (Baillargeon et al., 2010), others have suggested distinct processes subserving the two: Frith and Frith (2008), for instance, suggest implicit and explicit processes, while Apperly and Butterfill (2009) argue in favor of a…”
BackgroundInfluentialA longitudinal study of the relation between language and theory-of-mind development.
Astington, J. W., & Jenkins, J. M. (1999) · Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1037/0012-1649.35.5.1311 · Cited by 966
Theory of mind and rule-based reasoning
Frye, D., Zelazo, P. D., & Palfai, T. (1995) · Cognitive Development · doi:10.1016/0885-2014(95)90024-1 · Cited by 923
de Villiers, J. G., & Pyers, J. E. (2002) · Cognitive Development · doi:10.1016/s0885-2014(02)00073-4 · Cited by 661 · cited 2×
“In particular, it has been hypothesized that the mastery of complement sentences is related to false belief understanding (de Villiers & Pyers, 2002).”
BackgroundBeliefs about beliefs [P&W, SR&B]
Dennett, D. C. (1978) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00076664 · Cited by 609 · cited 1×
“The ability to understand others’ false beliefs is considered a crucial test of ToM (Bennett, 1978; Dennett, 1978), and the standard experimental paradigm used to test this ability is the false belief task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; Wimmer & Perner, 1983).”
BackgroundLanguage and theory of mind: a study of deaf children
Schick, B., De Villiers, P., De Villiers, J., & Hoffmeister, R. (2007) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01004.x · Cited by 585
Cited by
White matter maturation is associated with the emergence of Theory of Mind in early childhood
Grosse Wiesmann, C., Schreiber, J., Singer, T., Steinbeis, N., & Friederici, A. D. (2017) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/ncomms14692 · Cited by 114
Self-citationThe promise of awake behaving infant fMRI as a deep measure of cognition
Yates, T. S., Ellis, C. T., & Turk-Browne, N. B. (2021) · Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2020.11.007 · Cited by 29
“In preschoolers, success on implicit and explicit theory of mind tasks is neurally dissociated in terms of brain structure [71], fitting with previous work showing a behavioral dissociation [72].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Grosse Wiesmann, C., Friederici, A. D., Singer, T., & Steinbeis, N.
- Venue
- Developmental Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2016-10-02
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 5
- ISSN
- 1363-755X (ISSN-L)
- 1467-7687
- OpenAlex
- W2398273633
- Cited by
- 151
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 24.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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