HUMAN COOPERATION BASED ON PUNISHMENT REPUTATION
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The threat of punishment usually promotes cooperation. However, punishing itself is costly, rare in nonhuman animals, and humans who punish often finish with low payoffs in economic experiments. The evolution of punishment has therefore been unclear. Recent theoretical developments suggest that punishment has evolved in the context of reputation games. We tested this idea in a simple helping game with observers and with punishment and punishment reputation (experimentally controlling for other possible reputational effects). We show that punishers fully compensate their costs as they receive help more often. The more likely defection is punished within a group, the higher the level of within-group cooperation. These beneficial effects perish if the punishment reputation is removed. We conclude that reputation is key to the evolution of punishment.
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Citations
Cites
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02043 · Cited by 3,475 · cited 1×
“For example, humans playing an ultimatum game reject lower offers when they know that others will learn about their acceptance threshold (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003).”
BackgroundEvolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · Nature · doi:10.1038/31225 · Cited by 3,064 · cited 1×
“…group, for example by using an individual’s “image scoring” or “standing,” has been proposed as a potentially important mechanism to explain cooperation in humans (Nowak and Sigmund 1998; Wedekind and Milinski 2000; Milinski et al. 2002; Wedekind and Braithwaite 2002; Nowak and Sigmund 2005).”
BackgroundEvolution of indirect reciprocity
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2005) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature04131 · Cited by 2,762
Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’
Milinski, M., Semmann, D., & Krambeck, H.-J. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415424a · Cited by 1,371
The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good.
Yamagishi, T. (1986) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.51.1.110 · Cited by 1,359 · cited 3×
“Punishment of non-cooperators often promotes cooperation in humans (Yamagishi 1986; Fehr and Gächter 2000, 2002; Rockenbach and Milinski 2006; Sigmund 2007) and other animals (Bshary and Grutter 2005; Raihani et al. 2012).”
BackgroundDreber, A., Rand, D. G., Fudenberg, D., & Nowak, M. A. (2008) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature06723 · Cited by 718 · cited 3×
“Recent theory predicts that punishment has either evolved in another context than cooperation (Dreber et al. 2008; Wu et al. 2009) or that reputational effects compensate for the costs of punishment (Hilbe and Sigmund 2010; dos Santos et al. 2011).”
BackgroundPositive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation
Rand, D. G., Dreber, A., Ellingsen, T., Fudenberg, D., & Nowak, M. A. (2009) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1177418 · Cited by 715
Audience effects on moralistic punishment
Kurzban, R., DeScioli, P., & O'Brien, E. (2007) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2006.06.001 · Cited by 360
Cited by
Third-party punishers are rewarded, but third-party helpers even more so
Raihani, N. J., & Bshary, R. (2015) · Evolution · doi:10.1111/evo.12637 · Cited by 101
Partner choice versus punishment in human Prisoner’s Dilemmas
Barclay, P., & Raihani, N. (2016) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.12.004 · Cited by 67
“…cooperated + Partner punished 4 845.8 0.18 4 Partner cooperated 3 846.1 0.16 nishment in human Prisoner’s Dilemmas, Evolution and Human Behav- beneficial in the real world or even in less impoverished laboratory conditions (e.g. Barclay, 2006; dos Santos et al., 2011, 2013; Raihani & Bshary, 2015).”
BackgroundInfluentialTaking charge and stepping in: Individuals who punish are rewarded with prestige and dominance
Redhead, D., Dhaliwal, N., & Cheng, J. T. (2021) · Social and Personality Psychology Compass · doi:10.1111/spc3.12581 · Cited by 53
Metadata
- Authors
- dos Santos, M., Rankin, D. J., & Wedekind, C.
- Venue
- Evolution
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2013-04-09
- Volume
- 67
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 2446-2450
- ISSN
- 0014-3820 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2074549623
- Cited by
- 51
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 13.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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