The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Folk Psychology of Free Will: Fits and Starts
Abstract
Abstract: According to agent‐causal accounts of free will, agents have the capacity to cause actions, and for a given action, an agent could have done otherwise. This paper uses existing results and presents experimental evidence to argue that young children deploy a notion of agent‐causation. If young children do have such a notion, however, it remains quite unclear how they acquire it. Several possible acquisition stories are canvassed, including the possibility that the notion of agent‐causation develops from a prior notion of obligation. Finally, the paper sets out how this work might illuminate the philosophical problem of free will.
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Citations
Cites
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
(1982) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477 · Cited by 8,240
Gopnik, A., & Meltzoff, A. N. (1997) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/7289.001.0001 · Cited by 1,479
ToMM, ToBY, and Agency: Core architecture and domain specificity
Leslie, A. M. (1994) · Mapping the Mind · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511752902.006 · Cited by 1,105 · cited 1×
“Indeed, some of the most prominent theorists of folk psychology maintain that vital parts of folk psychology are innate (e.g. Fodor, 1992; Leslie, 1994).”
Background
Cited by
Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions
Nichols, S., & Knobe, J. (2007) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00666.x · Cited by 558
Self-citationSurveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility
Nahmias, E., Morris, S., Nadelhoffer, T., & Turner, J. (2005) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515080500264180 · Cited by 526
The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person versus Third Person Approaches
LUDWIG, K. (2007) · Midwest Studies in Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2007.00160.x · Cited by 384
NAHMIAS, E., MORRIS, S. G., NADELHOFFER, T., & TURNER, J. (2006) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00603.x · Cited by 328
THE RISE AND FALL OF EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY
Kauppinen, A. (2007) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869790701305871 · Cited by 324
Metadata
- Authors
- Nichols, S.
- Venue
- Mind & Language
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2004-10-20
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 473-502
- ISSN
- 0268-1064 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0017
- OpenAlex
- W2133405616
- Cited by
- 188
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 2.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Nichols, S. (2004). The Folk Psychology of Free Will: Fits and Starts. Mind & Language. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0268-1064.2004.00269.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.