ToMM, ToBY, and Agency: Core architecture and domain specificity
Abstract
Our understanding of Agency is, in part, the result of domain-specific learning. The nature of this domain-specific learning needs to be understood in relation to the organization of information processing in the infant. As a result of adaptive evolution, the infant is a specialized processor of information with an architecture that (in part) reflects properties of the world. On this assumption, it should be possible to establish links between properties of the world, processing subsystems specialized for tracking those properties, and domains of knowledge. It is argued in the case of Agency that three main classes of world properties are reflected in three corresponding processing subsystems producing three distinct levels of knowledge. These three related triples are, respectively, mechanical Agency, actional Agency, and attitudinal Agency. Each of these three linked property classes, processing subsystems, and knowledge levels are discussed in turn but the focus will be mainly on mechanical Agency. In developing these ideas this discussion deals more generally with the nature of early mechanical understanding and its relation to conceptual development. A number of the ideas put forward in Leslie (1988) are revised and extended. One lesson of cognitive science is that different types of knowledge often have different locations within the global organization of human information processing. In development, different types of commonsense knowledge may originate from different locations in core cognitive architecture. Early mechanical understanding and the notion of Agency can be studied within such a framework.
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The effect of social and ecological complexity may be limited to influencing more specialized, and potentially domain-specific, forms of cognition.
“Our findings suggest that the effect of social and ecological complexity may be limited to influencing more specialized, and potentially domain-specific forms of cognition (188-196).”
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“According to some theorists, specialized developmental mechanisms that are in place at birth (Baron-Cohen, 1994; Leslie, 1994; Premack, 1990) allow infants to interpret actions as goal directed very early in life.”
BackgroundGerman, T. P., & Hehman, J. (2006) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2005.05.007 · Cited by 241 · see citing works
“Such a core representational problem might manifest as a result of direct disruption to mechanisms that produce mental state representations (Leslie, 1987, 1994b, 2000; Leslie, & Roth, 1993) and/or as a result of disrupted input to such mechanisms on account of social-attention problems earlier in…”
Mandler, J. M., & Cánovas, C. P. (2014) · Language and Cognition · doi:10.1017/langcog.2014.14 · Cited by 265 · see citing works
“Although some developmentalists have proposed that young infants also have concepts of causality (Leslie, 1994 ) or energy (Luo, Kaufman, & Baillargeon, 2009 ), the extant data can more simply be explained solely in terms of conceptualizing motion of objects through space (see Mandler, 2012 , for…”
BackgroundCausal learning across domains.
Schulz, L., & Alison Gopnik, C. (2004) · Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1037/0012-1649.40.2.162 · Cited by 261 · see citing works
“It is possible, therefore, that causal knowledge is accurate not because of general mechanisms designed to infer causal structure from evidence but because of specialized core systems that evolved for information-processing tasks particular to each domain (Leslie, 1994).”
BackgroundLeslie, A. M. (1996) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198524021.003.0005 · Cited by 262 · see citing works
Self-citationSong, H.-J., Onishi, K. H., Baillargeon, R., & Fisher, C. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.08.008 · Cited by 257 · see citing works
“To reason correctly about such states, children must be able to hold in mind two distinct versions of the setting: one that corresponds to reality (as they construe it), and one that is decoupled from reality and corresponds to the agent’s representation (e.g., Leslie, 1994a).”
BackgroundSuperstitious, magical, and paranormal beliefs: An integrative model
Lindeman, M., & Aarnio, K. (2006) · Journal of Research in Personality · doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2006.06.009 · Cited by 249 · see citing works
“Part of this knowledge can be characterized as core knowledge in that children learn it without instruction, it provides a basis for further development, and it is based on domain specialized learning mechanisms (modules) about ecologically important entities and events (Carey, 1996; Leslie, 1994; Spelke, 2000).”
BackgroundStich, S. P., Laurence, S., & Carruthers, P. (2005) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195179675.001.0001 · Cited by 259 · see citing works
“On this view, certain cognitive abilities are indeed implemented by modular central systems, for example, our theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Leslie, 1994).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe recursive mind: the origins of human language, thought, and civilization
(2011) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.49-1164 · Cited by 253 · see citing works
Astuti, R., Solomon, G. E. A., & Carey, S. E. (2004) · Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development · doi:10.1111/j.0037-976x.2004.00296.x · Cited by 251 · see citing works
Boyer, P. (1998) · American Anthropologist · doi:10.1525/aa.1998.100.4.876 · Cited by 246 · see citing works
How Do Infants Learn About the Physical World?
Baillargeon, R. (1994) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/1467-8721.ep10770614 · Cited by 247 · see citing works
Infants’ perception of goal‐directed actions: development through cue‐based bootstrapping
Bı́ró, S., & Leslie, A. M. (2006) · Developmental Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2006.00544.x · Cited by 245 · see citing works
Self-citationThe Existential Theory of Mind
Bering, J. M. (2002) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/1089-2680.6.1.3 · Cited by 269 · see citing works
“…p er so na l u se o f t he in di vi du al u se r a nd is n ot to b e di ss em in at ed b ro ad ly . mind-reading abilities (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Frith, 1991; Happé & Frith, 1995; Leekam & Perner, 1990; Leslie, 1991, 1994; Swettenham, Baron-Cohen, Gomez, & Walsh, 1996; but see Frith & Happé, 1995).”
Background
- Authors
- Leslie, A. M.
- Affiliations
- Medical Research Council (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Leslie, Alan M.
- ORCID
- Leslie, Alan M.
- Venue
- Mapping the Mind
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1994-04-29
- Pages
- 119-148
- OpenAlex
- W1709947398
- Cited by
- 1,105
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 41 · 2024: 41 · 2023: 17 · 2022: 21 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 65 · 2019: 33 · 2018: 19 · 2017: 15 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 46 · 2014: 23 · 2013: 30 · 2012: 37
- FWCI
- 31.02
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Categorization, perception, and language
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- agency, domain-specific learning, commonsense knowledge, conceptual development, TOMM, adaptive evolution, knowledge level
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