The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Limits of Spectatorial Folk Psychology
Abstract
Abstract: It is almost universally agreed that the main business of commonsense psychology is that of providing generally reliable predictions and explanations of the actions of others. In line with this, it is also generally assumed that we are normally at theoretical remove from others such that we are always ascribing causally efficacious mental states to them for the purpose of prediction, explanation and control. Building on the work of those who regard our primary intersubjective interactions as a form of ‘embodied practice’, I defend a second‐personal approach in this paper.
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Citations
Cites
Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind
(1995) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.33-2412 · Cited by 3,670
Why the child’s theory of mind really is a theory
GOPNIK, A., & WELLMAN, H. M. (1992) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1992.tb00202.x · Cited by 1,158
In defense of the simulation theory.
GOLDMAN, A. I. (1992) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1992.tb00200.x · Cited by 516
Cited by
Participatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition
De Jaegher, H., & Di Paolo, E. (2007) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-007-9076-9 · Cited by 1,640
Toward a second-person neuroscience
Schilbach, L., Timmermans, B., Reddy, V., Costall, A., Bente, G., Schlicht, T., & Vogeley, K. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000660 · Cited by 1,510
Can social interaction constitute social cognition?
De Jaegher, H., Di Paolo, E., & Gallagher, S. (2010) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2010.06.009 · Cited by 911
Enactive intersubjectivity: Participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation
Fuchs, T., & De Jaegher, H. (2009) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-009-9136-4 · Cited by 826
How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition
Carruthers, P. (2009) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x09000545 · Cited by 610
Metadata
- Authors
- Hutto, D. D.
- Venue
- Mind & Language
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2004-10-20
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 548-573
- ISSN
- 0268-1064 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0017
- OpenAlex
- W2053915439
- Cited by
- 176
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 4.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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