The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy: Shareholders’ Protection or Expropriation?
Abstract
Abstract: We investigate the relationship between corporate governance quality and dividend policy in Canada. Based on the agency theory predictions, we consider the effect of two conflicting hypotheses about the effect of corporate governance on dividend payouts: the outcome and substitution hypotheses. The effectiveness of firm‐level governance mechanisms is assessed through the Globe & Mail annual corporate governance index and four sub‐categories scores (board composition, shareholding and compensation issues, shareholder rights issues and corporate governance disclosure policy). Using a sample of 714 firm‐years listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange over the period 2002‐2005, our results show that firms with stronger corporate governance have higher dividend payouts. Among the four components of the corporate governance index, we document that board composition and shareholder rights’ policy are positively related to payout ratios. We also find a positive association between firm size, the level of free cash flows and dividend payouts. Finally, we document a negative relationship between firm risk, US cross‐listing and dividend payouts. Taken together our results are consistent with the outcome model of dividend policy.
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Citations
Cites
Investigating causal relations by econometric models and cross-spectral methods
Granger, C. W. J. (1969) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912791 · Cited by 22,989
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250042 · Cited by 18,025
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1986) · Cited by 17,275
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment
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Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1996) · Corporate Bankruptcy · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609435.005 · Cited by 9,306
The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment
Terra, P. R. (2008) · Revista de Administração e Contabilidade da Unisinos · doi:10.4013/base.20082.07 · Cited by 8,615
Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares
Miller, M. H., & Modigliani, F. (1961) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/294442 · Cited by 6,558
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information
MILLER, M. H., & ROCK, K. (1985) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb02362.x · Cited by 3,441
Metadata
- Authors
- Adjaoud, F., & Ben‐Amar, W.
- Venue
- Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2010-06
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 5-6
- Pages
- 648-667
- ISSN
- 0306-686X (ISSN-L)
- 1468-5957
- OpenAlex
- W2136183150
- Cited by
- 323
- References
- 48
- FWCI
- 28.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Adjaoud, F., & Ben‐Amar, W. (2010). Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy: Shareholders’ Protection or Expropriation? Journal of Business Finance & Accounting. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.2010.02192.x
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