The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Economics of Private Sector Training: A Survey of the Literature
Open accessAbstract
This survey organizes and summarizes existing theoretical work on private sector training. The theoretical models focus on investment efficiency, finance and turnover. Recent developments in the on-the-job training literature are characterized by strategic interaction between employers and employees and emphasize market imperfections.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Filders, R. (1992) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(92)90130-2 · Cited by 16,165
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism
Dugger, W. M. (1987) · Journal of Economic Issues · doi:10.1080/00213624.1987.11504638 · Cited by 14,786
(2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.2.i · Cited by 13,709
Journal of economic literature
Armstrong, J. S. (1996) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(96)88197-0 · Cited by 9,923
Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis
Becker, G. S. (1962) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/258724 · Cited by 8,063
(1985) · Cited by 7,244
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Rubinstein, A. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912531 · Cited by 5,264
Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education
Becker, G. S. (1993) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226041223.001.0001 · Cited by 4,509
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling
Binmore, K., Rubinstein, A., & Wolinsky, A. (1986) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555382 · Cited by 2,511
Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
Myerson, R. B., & Satterthwaite, M. A. (1983) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0 · Cited by 2,504
An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability
Becker, G. S., Landes, E. M., & Michael, R. T. (1977) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260631 · Cited by 1,739
Oi, W. Y. (1962) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/258715 · Cited by 1,395
Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labour Markets
Acemoğlu, D., & Pischke, J. (1999) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00405 · Cited by 1,392
The Structure of Wages and Investment in General Training
Acemoglu, D., & Pischke, J. (1999) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250071 · Cited by 1,046
Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence
Acemoglu, D., & Pischke, J.-S. (1998) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355398555531 · Cited by 992
Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargaining Approach
Grout, P. A. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911498 · Cited by 945
Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence
Acemoglu, D., & Pischke, J.-S. (1996) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w5605 · Cited by 755
Pigou, A. C. (2009) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 751
Training and Innovation in an Imperfect Labour Market
Acemoglu, D. (1997) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2971723 · Cited by 626
Firm-Specific Human Capital as a Shared Investment
Hashimoto, M. (1981) · American Economic Review · Cited by 625
Investment in General Training: The Role of Information and Labour Mobility
Katz, E., & Ziderman, A. (1990) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2233964 · Cited by 475
Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market Contracts.
MacLeod, W. B., & Malcomson, J. M. (1993) · Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) · Cited by 460
Adverse Selection in the Labor Market
Greenwald, B. C. N. (2018) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780429023507 · Cited by 441
Specific Human Capital: An Application to Quit Rates and Layoff Rates
Parsons, D. O. (1972) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259961 · Cited by 398
Adverse Selection in the Labour Market
Greenwald, B. C. (1986) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297632 · Cited by 357
The Role of Promotion in Inducing Specific Human Capital Acquisition
Prendergast, C. (1993) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118343 · Cited by 322
Why Do Temporary Help Firms Provide Free General Skills Training?
Autor, D. (2000) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7637 · Cited by 319
Why Do Temporary Help Firms Provide Free General Skills Training?
Autor, D. H. (2001) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355301753265615 · Cited by 282
Two-Sided Uncertainty and "Up-or-Out" Contracts
Kahn, C., & Huberman, G. (1988) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/298190 · Cited by 265
Human Capital Investment under Asymmetric Information: The Pigovian Conjecture Revisited
Chang, C., & Wang, Y. (1996) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/209820 · Cited by 264
Firm-Specific Human Capital and Promotion Ladders
Carmichael, L. (1983) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003551 · Cited by 246
A Theory of Quits and Layoffs with Efficient Turnover
McLaughlin, K. J. (1991) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261738 · Cited by 220
The Excess Sensitivity of Layoffs and Quits to Demand
Hall, R. E., & Lazear, E. P. (1984) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/298032 · Cited by 212
A framework for understanding differences in labor turnover and human capital investment
Chun, C., & Wang, Y. (1995) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(95)00022-9 · Cited by 103
Labour Contracts and Efficiency in on-the-Job Training
Stevens, M. (1994) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2234760 · Cited by 53
Chapter 11 The determination of life cycle earnings: A survey
Weiss, Y. (1986) · Handbook of labour economics · doi:10.1016/s1573-4463(86)01014-3 · Cited by 46
Endogenous on-the-job training with moral hazard
Schlicht, E. (1996) · Labour Economics · doi:10.1016/0927-5371(95)00010-0 · Cited by 14
Cited by
Bassanini, A., Booth, A. L., Brunello, G., De Paola, M., & Leuven, E. (2005) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.756405 · Cited by 541
Self-citationEmployment Regimes and the Quality of Work
(2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230105.001.0001 · Cited by 468
Metadata
- Authors
- Leuven, E.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Surveys
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2005-02
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 91-111
- ISSN
- 0950-0804 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-6419
- OpenAlex
- W2089091037
- Cited by
- 256
- References
- 38
- FWCI
- 50.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.