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COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS, CONSTITUENT PREFERENCES, AND CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
Abstract
We model the behavior of a vote‐maximizing legislator in order to predict interest group campaign contributions to incumbent politicians. We show that committee assignments and voter preferences affect the price a legislator requires to produce policies for any interest group. An econometric analysis of actual interest group contributions shows that these groups make significantly larger contributions to legislators on committees with jurisdiction over especially relevant policy issues and to incumbents with non‐hostile constituencies. These results support our theory; interest groups act as if committees matter in the determination of policy and voters' interests constrain interest group behavior.
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Cites
Coase, R. H. (1960) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466560 · Cited by 18,255
(1987) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036932 · Cited by 638
Cited by
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Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy
HALL, R. L., & DEARDORFF, A. V. (2006) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055406062010 · Cited by 1,172
Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns
COOPER, M. J., GULEN, H., & OVTCHINNIKOV, A. V. (2010) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01548.x · Cited by 870
Political connections and SEC enforcement
Correia, M. M. (2014) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.04.004 · Cited by 693
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Bonica, A. (2014) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12062 · Cited by 680
Metadata
- Authors
- Grier, K. B., & Munger, M. C.
- Venue
- Economic Inquiry
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1991-01
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 24-43
- ISSN
- 0043-3640 (ISSN-L)
- 0095-2583
- 1465-7295
- OpenAlex
- W2038891097
- Cited by
- 225
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 16.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Grier, K. B., & Munger, M. C. (1991). COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS, CONSTITUENT PREFERENCES, AND CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS. Economic Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1991.tb01250.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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