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Cited by 225

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS, CONSTITUENT PREFERENCES, AND CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS

Grier, Kevin B., Munger, Michael C.·1991·Economic Inquiry

Abstract

We model the behavior of a vote‐maximizing legislator in order to predict interest group campaign contributions to incumbent politicians. We show that committee assignments and voter preferences affect the price a legislator requires to produce policies for any interest group. An econometric analysis of actual interest group contributions shows that these groups make significantly larger contributions to legislators on committees with jurisdiction over especially relevant policy issues and to incumbents with non‐hostile constituencies. These results support our theory; interest groups act as if committees matter in the determination of policy and voters' interests constrain interest group behavior.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1991.tb01250.x

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Metadata

Authors
Grier, K. B., & Munger, M. C.
Venue
Economic Inquiry
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1991-01
Volume
29
Issue
1
Pages
24-43
ISSN
  • 0043-3640 (ISSN-L)
  • 0095-2583
  • 1465-7295
OpenAlex
W2038891097
Cited by
225
References
2
FWCI
16.98
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS, CONSTITUENT PREFERENCES, AND CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1991.tb01250.x
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Grier, K. B., & Munger, M. C. (1991). COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS, CONSTITUENT PREFERENCES, AND CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS. Economic Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1991.tb01250.x

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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.