The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
DOES MONITORING INCREASE WORK EFFORT? THE RIVALRY WITH TRUST AND LOYALTY
Abstract
Principal‐agent theory suggests that tighter monitoring will raise an agent's work effort and will be applied provided that transaction costs are low. However, when a psychological contract exists between principals and agents, the agents perceive increased monitoring as an indication of distrust, and this induces them to reduce work effort. This “crowding out effect” is likely to dominate when the relationship between principals and agents is personal, while the “disciplining effect” is likely to dominate when the relationship is abstract, as in a competitive market setting. Empirical evidence from neighbouring sciences and from an econometric study supports this proposition.
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Cites
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Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?
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Cited by
Technostress: Technological Antecedents and Implications1
Ayyagari, R., Grover, V., & Purvis, R. (2011) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.2307/41409963 · Cited by 2,056
Control and Collaboration: Paradoxes of Governance
Sundaramurthy, C., & Lewis, M. (2003) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/30040729 · Cited by 1,112
Falk, A., & Kosfeld, M. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.5.1611 · Cited by 1,040
Van Slyke, D. M. (2006) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/mul012 · Cited by 885
Straining for Shared Meaning in Organization Science: Problems of Trust and Distrust
Bigley, G. A., & Pearce, J. L. (1998) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/259286 · Cited by 758
Metadata
- Authors
- FREY, B. S.
- Venue
- Economic Inquiry
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1993-10
- Volume
- 31
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 663-670
- ISSN
- 0043-3640 (ISSN-L)
- 0095-2583
- 1465-7295
- OpenAlex
- W2068232084
- Cited by
- 399
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 19.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- FREY, B. S. (1993). DOES MONITORING INCREASE WORK EFFORT? THE RIVALRY WITH TRUST AND LOYALTY. Economic Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1993.tb00897.x
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