The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
WHY HOLD‐UPS OCCUR: THE SELF‐ENFORCING RANGE OF CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS
Open accessAbstract
Court enforcement and private enforcement are not alternative contract enforcement mechanisms, but are used jointly by transactors to define the self‐enforcing range of a contractual relationship. Within this framework contract terms economize on the limited amounts of private enforcement capital possessed by transactors, either by directly controlling transactor behavior or by shifting private enforcement capital between transactors to coincide with likely future market conditions. Hold‐ups occur when market conditions change sufficiently to place the relationship outside the self‐enforcing range. This probabilistic view of hold‐ups is contrasted with opportunism more generally and with moral hazard behavior.
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Citations
Cites
Free competition and the optimal amount of fraud
Darby, M. R., & Karni, E. (1973) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466756 · Cited by 3,947
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653
Self-citation
Cited by
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Gulati, R., Wohlgezogen, F., & Zhelyazkov, P. (2012) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.5465/19416520.2012.691646 · Cited by 768
Dilli, S., Elert, N., & Herrmann, A. M. (2018) · Small Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s11187-018-0002-z · Cited by 149
Lazzarini, S. G., Miller, G. J., & Zenger, T. R. (2008) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1070.0336 · Cited by 141
Formal and Informal Contracting: Theory and Evidence
Gil, R., & Zanarone, G. (2017) · Annual Review of Law and Social Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110316-113413 · Cited by 56
Trust, Decision Rights Delegation, and Performance—The Case of Franchising
Herz, M., Hutzinger, C., Seferagic, H., & Windsperger, J. (2016) · Journal of Small Business Management · doi:10.1111/jsbm.12227 · Cited by 35
Metadata
- Authors
- Klein, B.
- Venue
- Economic Inquiry
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1996-07
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 444-463
- ISSN
- 0043-3640 (ISSN-L)
- 0095-2583
- 1465-7295
- OpenAlex
- W2078280209
- Cited by
- 543
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 24.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Klein, B. (1996). WHY HOLD‐UPS OCCUR: THE SELF‐ENFORCING RANGE OF CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS. Economic Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1996.tb01388.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
