The DOI matches its Crossref record; 84 of the 84 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Dominant CEO, Deviant Strategy, and Extreme Performance: The Moderating Role of a Powerful Board
Abstract
This study examines the effect of dominant CEOs – defined as CEOs who are very powerful relative to other executives in their top management teams – on firm strategy and performance. Based on a sample of 51 publicly traded, single‐business firms from the US computer industry for the period 1997–2003, our results suggest that firms with dominant CEOs tend to have a strategy deviant from the industry central tendency and thus extreme performance – either big wins or big losses. Further, powerful boards weaken the tendency of dominant CEOs towards extremeness and, more important, improve the likelihood of dominant CEOs having big wins versus big losses. This study reconciles the pessimistic and heroic views regarding dominant CEOs, and suggests that the notion of power balance should be considered in a broader context.
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Cites
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Cited by
CEO Career Variety: Effects on Firm-Level Strategic and Social Novelty
Crossland, C., Zyung, J., Hiller, N. J., & Hambrick, D. C. (2014) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2012.0469 · Cited by 487
Power in Management and Organization Science
Fleming, P. J., & Spicer, A. (2014) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.1080/19416520.2014.875671 · Cited by 461
Managerial Risk Taking: A Multitheoretical Review and Future Research Agenda
Hoskisson, R. E., Chirico, F., Zyung, J. (., & Gambeta, E. (2017) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206316671583 · Cited by 441
CEO Narcissism, Risk-Taking, and Resilience: An Empirical Analysis in U.S. Commercial Banks
Buyl, T., Boone, C., & Wade, J. B. (2019) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206317699521 · Cited by 367
In Pursuit of Greatness: CEO Narcissism, Entrepreneurial Orientation, and Firm Performance Variance
Wales, W. J., Patel, P. C., & Lumpkin, G. T. (2013) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/joms.12034 · Cited by 359
Metadata
- Authors
- Tang, J., Crossan, M., & Rowe, W. G.
- Venue
- Journal of Management Studies
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2011-01-26
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 1479-1503
- ISSN
- 0022-2380 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-6486
- OpenAlex
- W2121132619
- Cited by
- 322
- References
- 84
- FWCI
- 13.51
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Tang, J., Crossan, M., & Rowe, W. G. (2011). Dominant CEO, Deviant Strategy, and Extreme Performance: The Moderating Role of a Powerful Board. Journal of Management Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2010.00985.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.