The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Are Political Connections a Blessing or a Curse? Evidence from CEO Turnover in China
Abstract
Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: This paper investigates the issue of forced CEO turnover in China and summarizes the economic consequences of political connections within the framework of corporate governance. Research Findings/Insights: Using a large sample of listed firms in China from 2005 to 2008, we find that politically connected CEOs are less likely to be fired and that the sensitivity of forced turnover to firm performance is weaker for connected CEOs than for their non‐connected peers. This suggests that CEOs in a transition economy tend to use their political resources for their own good. We also find a significantly positive relationship between the political connections of retained CEOs and future firm performance only when firm profitability is below the industry median. These findings suggest that the value of political connections is contingent on a firm's operating performance, and that the benefits of political connections may outweigh their costs when firms do not meet their profitability targets. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study is the first to examine how the political ties of CEOs relate to their forced turnover. It integrates agency theory with resource dependence theory and contributes to the ongoing debate on the role of political connections in emerging markets. It also takes a step toward reconciling the mixed evidence for the effects of political connections on firm performance by demonstrating a sharp difference between firms under different operating statuses. Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study offers insights to policy makers who are interested in improving corporate governance in transitional economies such as China, where CEOs have close connections with the government. It also provides a deep perspective for the boards in politically connected firms, allowing them to deal with the relationship between top management and the government in a healthy way.
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Cites
Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives
Williamson, O. E. (1991) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2393356 · Cited by 7,151
Managerial control of voting rights
Stulz, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90039-6 · Cited by 2,429
Institutions, ownership, and finance: the determinants of profit reinvestment among Chinese firms
CULL, R., & XU, L. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.05.010 · Cited by 1,023
Johnson, S., McMillan, J., & Woodruff, C. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282802762024539 · Cited by 980
Cited by
The Contingent Value of Corporate Political Ties
Sun, P., Mellahi, K., & Wright, M. (2012) · Academy of Management Perspectives · doi:10.5465/amp.2011.0164 · Cited by 374
Corporate ownership and managerial turnover in China and Eastern Europe: A comparative meta-analysis
Iwasaki, I., Ma, X., & Mizobata, S. (2020) · Journal of Economics and Business · doi:10.1016/j.jeconbus.2020.105928 · Cited by 51
Metadata
- Authors
- You, J., & Du, G.
- Venue
- Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2011-12-16
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 179-194
- ISSN
- 0964-8410 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8683
- OpenAlex
- W2151503199
- Cited by
- 189
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 16.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- You, J., & Du, G. (2012). Are Political Connections a Blessing or a Curse? Evidence from CEO Turnover in China. Corporate Governance: An International Review. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2011.00902.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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