The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
XIV*-MAKING SENSE OF RELATIVE TRUTH
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Citations
Cites
Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts
Searle, J. R. (1979) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609213 · Cited by 3,502
Buhr, R., & Dummett, M. (1983) · Language · doi:10.2307/414091 · Cited by 3,368
Making it explicit : reasoning, representing, and discursive commitment
Brandom, R. B. (1994) · Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association · Cited by 2,620
Future Contingents and Relative Truth
MacFarlane, J. (2003) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00315 · Cited by 614
Self-citationInvariances: The Structure of the Objective World
Nozick, R. (2001) · Cited by 526
Oxford Studies In Epistemology
(2005) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199285891.001.0001 · Cited by 400
Richard, M. (2004) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1023/b:phil.0000029358.77417.df · Cited by 291
Kolbel, M. (2003) · Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society · doi:10.1111/1467-9264.t01-1-00003 · Cited by 241
(2020) · Doing Hermeneutic Phenomenological Research: A Practical Guide · doi:10.4135/9781529799583.n3 · Cited by 203
Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth
(2005) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199267408.001.0001 · Cited by 186
Protagoras and Self-Refutation in Plato's Theaetetus
Burnyeat, M. F. (1976) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183729 · Cited by 113
Cited by
Trust, Distrust and Commitment
Hawley, K. (2014) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12000 · Cited by 535
MacFarlane, J. (2007) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-006-9049-9 · Cited by 372
Self-citationMacFarlane, J. (2009) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-007-9286-2 · Cited by 300
Self-citationThe Many Relativisms: Index, Context, and Beyond
de Sa, D. L. (2011) · A Companion to Relativism · doi:10.1002/9781444392494.ch6 · Cited by 24
Metadata
- Authors
- MacFarlane, J.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2005-05
- Volume
- 105
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 321-339
- ISSN
- 0066-7374 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9264
- OpenAlex
- W4255970744
- Cited by
- 267
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 324.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.