The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Disjunction Effect in Choice under Uncertainty
Abstract
One of the basic axioms of the rational theory of decision under uncertainty is Savage's (1954) sure-thing principle (STP) It states that if prospect x is preferred to y knowing that Event A occurred, and if x is preferred to y knowing that A did not occur, then x should be preferred to y even when it is not known whether A occurred We present examples in which the decision maker has good reasons for accepting x if A occurs, and different reasons for accepting x if A does not occur Not knowing whether or not A occurs, however, the decision maker may lack a clear reason for accepting x and may opt for another option We suggest that, in the presence of uncertainty, people are often reluctant to think through the implications of each outcome and, as a result, may violate STP This interpretation is supported by the observation that STP is satisfied when people are made aware of their preferences given each outcome
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Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
Self-citationProspect theory: An analysis of decision under risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1988) · Decision, Probability and Utility · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609220.014 · Cited by 32,474
Self-citationAdvances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00122574 · Cited by 15,467
Self-citation(2001) · Empirical Direction in Design and Analysis · doi:10.4324/9781410600004-24 · Cited by 6,808
The Foundations of Statistics.
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RATIONAL CHOICE AND THE FRAMING OF DECISIONS
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1988) · Decision Making · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511598951.011 · Cited by 3,712
Self-citationRational Choice and the Framing of Decisions
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1986) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296365 · Cited by 3,622
Self-citationThaler, R. H., & Johnson, E. J. (1990) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.36.6.643 · Cited by 2,374
Our Stubborn Quest for Diagnostic Certainty
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Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
(2013) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/11166.1573-0476 · Cited by 358
Cited by
Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory
Mercier, H., & Sperber, D. (2011) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x10000968 · Cited by 2,254
Shafir, E. (1993) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(93)90034-s · Cited by 1,453
Self-citationValue from hedonic experience and engagement
Higgins, E. T. (2006) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.113.3.439 · Cited by 949
Thinking through uncertainty: Nonconsequential reasoning and choice
Shafir, E., & Tversky, A. (1992) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(92)90015-t · Cited by 660
Self-citationHiggins, E. T., Idson, L. C., Freitas, A. L., Spiegel, S., & Molden, D. C. (2003) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.84.6.1140 · Cited by 658
Metadata
- Authors
- Tversky, A., & Shafir, E.
- Venue
- Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1992-09
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 305-310
- ISSN
- 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9280
- OpenAlex
- W2031845357
- Cited by
- 581
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 4.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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