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Throwing a Bomb on a Person Versus Throwing a Person on a Bomb: Intervention Myopia in Moral Intuitions
Abstract
Most people consider it morally acceptable to redirect a trolley that is about to kill five people to a track where the trolley would kill only one person. In this situation, people seem to follow the guidelines of utilitarianism by preferring to minimize the number of victims. However, most people would not consider it moral to have a visitor in a hospital killed to save the lives of five patients who were otherwise going to die. We conducted two experiments in which we pinpointed a novel factor behind these conflicting intuitions. We show that moral intuitions are influenced by the locus of the intervention in the underlying causal model. In moral dilemmas, judgments conforming to the prescriptions of utilitarianism are more likely when the intervention influences the path of the agent of harm (e.g., the trolley) than when the intervention influences the path of the potential patient (i.e., victim).
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Citations
Cites
Seeing Versus Doing: Two Modes of Accessing Causal Knowledge.
Waldmann, M. R., & Hagmayer, Y. (2005) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition · doi:10.1037/0278-7393.31.2.216 · Cited by 190
Self-citation
Cited by
Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment
Greene, J. D., Morelli, S. A., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.11.004 · Cited by 1,231
Pushing moral buttons: The interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment
Greene, J. D., Cushman, F. A., Stewart, L. E., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2009) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2009.02.001 · Cited by 633
Action, Outcome, and Value: A Dual-System Framework for Morality
Cushman, F. (2013) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868313495594 · Cited by 473
Principled moral sentiment and the flexibility of moral judgment and decision making
Bartels, D. M. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.001 · Cited by 435
Beyond point-and-shoot morality: why cognitive (neuro)science matters for ethics
Greene, J. D. (2014) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/675875 · Cited by 375
Metadata
- Authors
- Waldmann, M. R., & Dieterich, J. H.
- Venue
- Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2007-03
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 247-253
- ISSN
- 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9280
- OpenAlex
- W2165130739
- Cited by
- 171
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 4.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Waldmann, M. R., & Dieterich, J. H. (2007). Throwing a Bomb on a Person Versus Throwing a Person on a Bomb: Intervention Myopia in Moral Intuitions. Psychological Science. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01884.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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