Cursed by Resources or Institutions?
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 53 of the 53 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Natural resource‐abundant countries constitute both growth losers and growth winners, and the main difference between the success cases and the cases of failure lies in the quality of institutions. With grabber‐friendly institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down, while with producer‐friendly institutions more natural resources increase income. Such a theory finds strong support in data. A key question we also discuss is if resources in addition alter the quality of institutions. When that is the case, countries with bad institutions suffer a double resource curse – as the deterioration of institutions strengthens the negative effect of more natural resources.
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Citations
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Cited by
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“Mehlum et al. (2006) also develop theoretical and empirical models to show how ‘grabber-friendly’ institutions that encourage corruption constrain growth in a mineral-rich environment.”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Mehlum, H., Moene, K., & Torvik, R.
- Venue
- The World Economy
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2006-04-12
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 1117-1131
- ISSN
- 0378-5920 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9701
- OpenAlex
- W2107449198
- Cited by
- 516
- References
- 53
- FWCI
- 35.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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