The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Nonconceptual Content: From Perceptual Experience to Subpersonal Computational States
Abstract
Abstract:Philosophers have often argued that ascriptions of content are appropriate only to the personal level states of folk psychology. Against this, this paper defends the view that the familiar propositional attitudes and states defined over them are part of a larger set of cognitive processes that do not make constitutive reference to concept possession. It does this by showing that states with nonconceptual content exist both in perceptual experience and in subpersonal information‐processing systems. What makes these states content‐involving is their satisfaction of certain basic conditions deriving from a general account of representation‐driven behaviour that is neutral on the question of concept possession. It is also argued that creatures can be in states with nonconceptual content even though they possess no conceptual abilities at all.
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Cites
Fodor, J. A. (1983) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4737.001.0001 · Cited by 7,734
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism
Millikan, R. G. (1984) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4124.001.0001 · Cited by 4,758
The construction of reality in the child.
Piaget, J. (1954) · doi:10.1037/11168-000 · Cited by 4,558
Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis
Fodor, J. A., & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1988) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(88)90031-5 · Cited by 4,022
A Common Coding Approach to Perception and Action
Prinz, W. (1990) · Relationships Between Perception and Action · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-75348-0_7 · Cited by 751
Cited by
Is vision continuous with cognition?: The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception
Pylyshyn, Z. (1999) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x99002022 · Cited by 1,243
A theory of implicit and explicit knowledge
Dienes, Z., & Perner, J. (1999) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x99002186 · Cited by 672
Theories of emotion causation: A review
Moors, A. (2009) · Cognition & Emotion · doi:10.1080/02699930802645739 · Cited by 472
Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception
Matthen, M. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199268509.001.0001 · Cited by 333
Varieties of cognitive penetration in visual perception
Vetter, P., & Newen, A. (2014) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.04.007 · Cited by 263
Metadata
- Authors
- BERMÚDEZ, J. L.
- Venue
- Mind & Language
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1995-12
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 333-369
- ISSN
- 0268-1064 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0017
- OpenAlex
- W2007411367
- Cited by
- 198
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 1.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- BERMÚDEZ, J. L. (1995). Nonconceptual Content: From Perceptual Experience to Subpersonal Computational States. Mind & Language. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00019.x
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.