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Cited by 400

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium1

Open access
Dubey, Pradeep, Geanakoplos, John, Shubik, Martin·2005·Econometrica

Abstract

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena in a perfectly competitive, general equilibrium framework. Perfect competition eliminates the need for lenders to compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates. It also makes for a simple equilibrium refinement, which we propose in order to rule out irrational pessimism about deliveries of untraded assets. We show that refined equilibrium always exists in our model, and that default, in conjunction with refinement, opens the door to a theory of endogenous assets. The market chooses the promises, default penalties, and quantity constraints of actively traded assets.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00563.x

Cites

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Metadata

Authors
Dubey, P., Geanakoplos, J., & Shubik, M.
Venue
Econometrica
Published
2005-01
Volume
73
Issue
1
Pages
1-37
ISSN
  • 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-0262
OpenAlex
W2139142975
Cited by
400
References
21
FWCI
50.57
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium1. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00563.x
The paper
Dubey, P., Geanakoplos, J., & Shubik, M. (2005). Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium1. Econometrica. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00563.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.