The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium1
Open accessAbstract
We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena in a perfectly competitive, general equilibrium framework. Perfect competition eliminates the need for lenders to compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates. It also makes for a simple equilibrium refinement, which we propose in order to rule out irrational pessimism about deliveries of untraded assets. We show that refined equilibrium always exists in our model, and that default, in conjunction with refinement, opens the door to a theory of endogenous assets. The market chooses the promises, default penalties, and quantity constraints of actively traded assets.
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Cites
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Cited by
A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default
Chatterjee, S., Corbae, D., Nakajima, M., & Ríos-Rull, J.-V. (2007) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00806.x · Cited by 572
Collateral, Risk Management, and the Distribution of Debt Capacity
RAMPINI, A. A., & VISWANATHAN, S. (2010) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01616.x · Cited by 525
Consumer Bankruptcy: A Fresh Start
Livshits, I., MacGee, J., & Tertilt, M. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.1.402 · Cited by 423
Metadata
- Authors
- Dubey, P., Geanakoplos, J., & Shubik, M.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2005-01
- Volume
- 73
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-37
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0262
- OpenAlex
- W2139142975
- Cited by
- 400
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 50.57
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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