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Political Economy of Mechanisms
Abstract
We study the provision of dynamic incentives to self-interested politicians who control the allocation of resources in the context of the standard neoclassical growth model. Citizens discipline politicians using elections. We show that the need to provide incentives to the politician in power creates political economy distortions in the structure of production, which resemble aggregate tax distortions. We provide conditions under which the political economy distortions persist or disappear in the long run. If the politicians are as patient as the citizens, the best subgame perfect equilibrium leads to an asymptotic allocation where the aggregate distortions arising from political economy disappear. In contrast, when politicians are less patient than the citizens, political economy distortions remain asymptotically and lead to positive aggregate labor and capital taxes.
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Citations
Cites
The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.5.1369 · Cited by 8,517
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510809 · Cited by 4,810
Cited by
The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics
Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.4.1218 · Cited by 1,637
The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics
Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2007) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w13028 · Cited by 466
Growth in the Shadow of Expropriation *
Aguiar, M., & Amador, M. (2011) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjr015 · Cited by 268
A Theory of Military Dictatorships
Acemoglu, D., Ticchi, D., & Vindigni, A. (2010) · American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics · doi:10.1257/mac.2.1.1 · Cited by 257
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Metadata
- Authors
- Acemoglu, D., Golosov, M., & Tsyvinski, A.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2008-05
- Volume
- 76
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 619-641
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0262
- OpenAlex
- W1522361502
- Cited by
- 158
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 31.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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