The DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
COOPERATION, COOPTATION, AND REBELLION UNDER DICTATORSHIPS
Abstract
Dictatorships are not all the same: some are purely autocratic but many exhibit a full panoply of seemingly democratic institutions. To explain these differences, we develop a model in which dictators may need cooperation to generate rents and may face a threat of rebellion. Dictators have two instruments: they can make policy concessions or share rents. We conclude that when they need more cooperation dictators make more extensive policy concessions and share fewer rents. In turn, when the threat of rebellion is greater, they make larger concessions but also distribute more spoils. Assuming that policy concessions require an institutional setting of legislatures and parties, we test this prediction statistically for all dictatorships that existed between 1946 and 1996.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Journal of economic literature
Armstrong, J. S. (1996) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(96)88197-0 · Cited by 9,923
Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America
Przeworski, A. (1991) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139172493 · Cited by 3,494
Self-citationRoss, M. L. (2001) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.2001.0011 · Cited by 3,409
A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality
Deininger, K., & Squire, L. (1996) · The World Bank Economic Review · doi:10.1093/wber/10.3.565 · Cited by 3,049
Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990
Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2000) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804946 · Cited by 2,845
Self-citationDemocracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America
Chakravarty, S. P., & Przeworski, A. (1992) · Bulletin of Latin American Research · doi:10.2307/3338135 · Cited by 2,181
Self-citationEthnic and Cultural Diversity by Country*
Fearon, J. D. (2003) · Journal of Economic Growth · doi:10.1023/a:1024419522867 · Cited by 1,829
Democracy and Development: List of Tables and Figures
Przeworski, A., Álvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2000) · Cited by 1,686
Self-citationDependency and Development in Latin America
Monteon, M., Cardoso, F. H., Faletto, E., & Urquidi, M. M. (1979) · The History Teacher · doi:10.2307/492408 · Cited by 1,639
Elections Without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation
Schedler, A. (2002) · Journal of Democracy · doi:10.1353/jod.2002.0031 · Cited by 1,616
The paradox of plenty: oil booms and petro-states
(1998) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.35-3431 · Cited by 1,445
The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States
Karl, T. L. (1997) · University of California Press eBooks · doi:10.1525/9780520918696 · Cited by 1,422
Modernization and bureaucratic-authoritarianism: studies in South American politics
O'Donnell, G. A. (1973) · Cited by 1,322
(2006) · The Elgar Companion to Development Studies · doi:10.4337/9781847202864.00031 · Cited by 1,269
The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force
McGuire, M. C., & Olson, M. (1998) · The Political Dimension of Economic Growth · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-26284-7_3 · Cited by 1,002
Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars
REYNAL-QUEROL, M. (2002) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002702046001003 · Cited by 966
Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive
(2015) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.187502 · Cited by 947
Atkinson, A. B., & Brandolini, A. (2001) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.39.3.771 · Cited by 905
Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960–1999
Smith, B. (2004) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00067.x · Cited by 720
Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism
Erickson, K. P. (1975) · Hispanic American Historical Review · doi:10.1215/00182168-55.3.565 · Cited by 691
(1983) · International Monetary Fund eBooks · doi:10.5089/9781451949261.084 · Cited by 546
The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship
Wintrobe, R. (1990) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1962769 · Cited by 430
Gehlbach, S., & Keefer, P. (2011) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2011.04.002 · Cited by 429
Grossman, H. (1999) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oep/51.2.267 · Cited by 261
Why Do Resource Dependent Countries Have Authoritarian Governments
Wantchekon, L. (2002) · The Journal of African Development · Cited by 250
World economic outlook / International Monetary Fund
Bubaš, Z. (1999) · Cited by 231
Dahl, R. A. (1973) · Cited by 215
Bobbio, N. (1984) · Telos · doi:10.3817/0984061003 · Cited by 200
So You Say You Want a Revolution: A Game Theoretic Explanation of Revolution in Repressive Regimes
Ginkel, J., & Smith, A. M. (1999) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002799043003002 · Cited by 173
Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government and Politics
Brooker, P. (2000) · Cited by 161
Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy
Dallin, A., Friedrich, C. J., & Brzeziński, Z. (1958) · The Russian Review · doi:10.2307/126031 · Cited by 151
One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast
Zolberg, A. R. (1964) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400876563 · Cited by 124
Regimes in Tropical Africa: Changing Forms of Supremacy, 1945–1975
Collier, R. B. (1982) · University of California Press eBooks · doi:10.1525/9780520319141 · Cited by 122
Lewellen, T. C. (1995) · Cited by 117
Debate—Proportional Representation: PR and Democratic Statecraft
Quade, Q. L. (1991) · Journal of democracy · doi:10.1353/jod.1991.0030 · Cited by 78
One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast
(1970) · International Affairs · doi:10.1093/ia/46.4.863 · Cited by 70
Regimes in Tropical Africa: Changing Forms of Supremacy, 1945-1975
Bustin, É., & Collier, R. B. (1983) · The American Historical Review · doi:10.2307/1874126 · Cited by 59
Cooption and Repression in the Soviet Union
Gershenson, D., & Grossman, H. I. (2001) · Economics and Politics · doi:10.1111/1468-0343.00082 · Cited by 47
Multiparty Democracy and Political Change: Constraints to Democratization in Africa
(2018) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780429451126 · Cited by 26
Presidential Succession and Democratic TransitionsPreprint
Baturo, A. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.980702 · Cited by 9
The Violent and the Weak: When Dictators Care About Social ContractsPreprint
Kirstein, R., & Voigt, S. (2000) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.2139/ssrn.420441 · Cited by 3
Cited by
The Politics of Authoritarian Rule
Svolik, M. W. (2012) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139176040 · Cited by 2,611
Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats
Gandhi, J., & Przeworski, A. (2007) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414007305817 · Cited by 1,523
“The argument in this section is based on a formal model in Gandhi and Przeworski (2006). 4.”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationElections Under Authoritarianism
Gandhi, J., & Lust-Okar, E. (2009) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.060106.095434 · Cited by 1,129
Self-citationCredible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule
Magaloni, B. (2008) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414007313124 · Cited by 1,121
The three pillars of stability: Legitimation, repression, and co-optation in autocratic regimes
Gerschewski, J. (2013) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2013.738860 · Cited by 1,053
Metadata
- Authors
- GANDHI, J., & PRZEWORSKI, A.
- Venue
- Economics and Politics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2006-03
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-26
- ISSN
- 0954-1985 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0343
- OpenAlex
- W2086651280
- Cited by
- 979
- References
- 41
- FWCI
- 62.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.