Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining Over Dispute Resolution Provisions
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have become the dominant source of rules on foreign direct investment (FDI), yet these treaties vary significantly in at least one important respect: whether they allow investment disputes to be settled through the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Through the compilation and careful coding of the text of nearly 1,500 treaties, we identify systematic variation in “legal delegation” to ICSID across BITs and explain this important variation by drawing upon a bargaining framework. Home governments prefer and typically obtain ICSID clauses in their BITs, particularly when internal forces push strongly for such provisions and when they have significantly greater bargaining power than the other signatory. Yet some home governments are less likely to insist upon ICSID clauses if they have historical or military ties with the other government. On the other hand, although host governments are often hostile toward ICSID clauses, particularly when sovereignty costs are high, they are more likely to consent to such clauses when they are heavily constrained by their dependence on the global economy. Our findings have significant implications for those interested in FDI, legalization, international institutions, and interstate bargaining.
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Why Should I Believe You? The Costs and Consequences of Bilateral Investment Treaties
Kerner, A. (2009) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.01524.x · Cited by 268
Cited by
The Political Economy of the Investment Treaty Regime
Bonnitcha, J., Skovgaard Poulsen, L. N., & Waibel, M. (2017) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/law/9780198719540.001.0001 · Cited by 345
When the Claim Hits: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bounded Rational Learning
Poulsen, L. N. S., & Aisbett, E. (2013) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887113000063 · Cited by 322
Simmons, B. A. (2014) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887113000312 · Cited by 306
Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investment
Allee, T., & Peinhardt, C. (2011) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818311000099 · Cited by 252
Self-citationUnder One Roof: Supply Chains and the Protection of Foreign Investment
JOHNS, L., & WELLHAUSEN, R. L. (2016) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s000305541500057x · Cited by 185
“They emphasize the role of repeated interactions and reputation in creating informal property rights (Ahlquist and Prakash 2010; Albertus and Menaldo 2012; Allee and Peinhardt 2010; Cole and English 1991; Dixit 2004).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Allee, T., & Peinhardt, C.
- Venue
- International Studies Quarterly
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2010-03
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-26
- ISSN
- 0020-8833 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2478
- OpenAlex
- W1999095697
- Cited by
- 228
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 29.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- Allee, T., & Peinhardt, C. (2010). Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining Over Dispute Resolution Provisions. International Studies Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00575.x
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