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A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy
Abstract
We test the proposition that the federal bureaucracy exhibits a “bias toward business” during notice and comment rulemaking. We analyze over 30 bureaucratic rules and almost 1,700 comments over the period of 1994 to 2001. We find that business commenters, but not nonbusiness commenters, hold important influence over the content of final rules. We also demonstrate that as the proportion of business commenters increases, so too does the influence of business interests. These findings contrast with previous empirical studies and generally suggest that notice and comment procedures have not succeeded in “democratizing” the agency policymaking process to the extent sometimes suggested in the normative rulemaking literature.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Yackee, J. W., & Yackee, S. W.
- Venue
- The Journal of Politics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2006-02
- Volume
- 68
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 128-139
- ISSN
- 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2508
- OpenAlex
- W2125952025
- Cited by
- 515
- References
- 42
- FWCI
- 12.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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