The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Interrelationship Between Managerial Ownership and Board Structure
Abstract
The paper tests the hypothesis that high managerial ownership entrenches managers by allowing the CEO to create a board that is unlikely to monitor. The results show a strong negative relationship between the level of managerial ownership and corporate governance factors, such as, the split of the roles of the CEO and the Chairman, the proportion of non‐executive directors, and the appointment of a non‐executive director as a Chairman. I also find that companies with low managerial ownership are more likely to change their board structure to comply with the Cadbury (1992) recommendations. The results suggest that managers, through their high ownership, choose a board that is unlikely to monitor. Overall, the findings cast doubt on the effectiveness of the board as an internal corporate governance mechanism when managerial ownership is high.
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Cites
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243 · cited 1×
“5% reported by Short and Keasey (1999) for a sample of 225 UK listed companies in 1988 and in 1992, respectively and the 9% reported by Peasnell et al.”
Managerial control of voting rights
Stulz, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90039-6 · Cited by 2,429
Cited by
Managerial Entrenchment and Corporate Social Performance
Surroca, J., & Tribó, J. A. (2008) · Journal of Business Finance & Accounting · doi:10.1111/j.1468-5957.2008.02090.x · Cited by 410
Grove, H., Patelli, L., Victoravich, L. M., & Xu, P. T. (2011) · Corporate Governance: An International Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2011.00882.x · Cited by 403
The Role of Dividends, Debt and Board Structure in the Governance of Family Controlled Firms
Setia‐Atmaja, L., Tanewski, G. A., & Skully, M. (2009) · Journal of Business Finance & Accounting · doi:10.1111/j.1468-5957.2009.02151.x · Cited by 343
The determinants of board size and composition: Evidence from the UK
Guest, P. M. (2008) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.01.002 · Cited by 294
Governance and Politics: Regulating Independence and Diversity in the Board Room
Bøhren, Ø., & Strøm, R. Ø. (2010) · Journal of Business Finance & Accounting · doi:10.1111/j.1468-5957.2010.02222.x · Cited by 283
Metadata
- Authors
- Lasfer, M. A.
- Venue
- Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2006-05-03
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 7-8
- Pages
- 1006-1033
- ISSN
- 0306-686X (ISSN-L)
- 1468-5957
- OpenAlex
- W2143674491
- Cited by
- 166
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 34.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Lasfer, M. A. (2006). The Interrelationship Between Managerial Ownership and Board Structure. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.2006.00600.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.