Can Young People with Autism Refer to Knowledge States? Evidence from Their Understanding of “Know” and “Guess”
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A number of studies have reported that most individuals with autism have difficulty in attributing mental states. The primary aim of the present study was to compare the ability of children with autism to refer to knowledge states with that of mainstream school children and children with Down's syndrome. The second aim was to investigate the role of verbal mental age in referring to knowledge states. The third aim was to compare the ease with which the children referred to their own mental state and to that of others. The results suggest that some individuals with autism are able to attribute knowledge to themselves and others but that they need to have higher verbal skills than is necessary in normal individuals. The level of language skill predicted the performance of the individuals with autism, but not that of the children in the other groups. There was no good evidence that referring to one's own mental states was easier than referring to another person's, a finding which supports representational theory rather than the simulationist position.
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Citations
Cites
Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind” ?
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8 · Cited by 8,599
Three-year-olds’ difficulty with false belief: The case for a conceptual deficit
Perner, J., Leekam, S. R., & Wimmer, H. (1987) · British Journal of Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.2044-835x.1987.tb01048.x · Cited by 1,550
The Role of Age and Verbal Ability in the Theory of Mind Task Performance of Subjects with Autism
Happe, F. G. E. (1995) · Child Development · doi:10.2307/1131954 · Cited by 1,227
Exploration of the autistic child’s theory of mind: Knowledge, belief, and communication
Perner, J., Frith, U., Leslie, A. M., & Leekam, S. R. (1989) · Child Development · doi:10.2307/1130734 · Cited by 757
Cited by
How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition
Carruthers, P. (2009) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x09000545 · Cited by 610
“(Curiously, Carruthers never cites this study, though he does cite a later study of children with autism that employed much the same paradigm, albeit with different – and for his purposes , more favorable – results; see Kazak et al. 1997.)”
BackgroundTheory of Mind and Self‐Consciousness: What Is It Like to Be Autistic?
Frith, U., & Happé, F. (1999) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/1468-0017.00100 · Cited by 527
Language acquisition in autism spectrum disorders: A developmental review
Eigsti, I.-M., de Marchena, A. B., Schuh, J. M., & Kelley, E. (2011) · Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders · doi:10.1016/j.rasd.2010.09.001 · Cited by 507
Fisher, N., & Happé, F. (2005) · Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders · doi:10.1007/s10803-005-0022-9 · Cited by 258
Hutchins, T. L., Prelock, P. A., & Bonazinga, L. (2012) · Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders · doi:10.1007/s10803-011-1244-7 · Cited by 214
Metadata
- Authors
- Kazak, S., Collis, G. M., & Lewis, V.
- Venue
- Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1997-11
- Volume
- 38
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 1001-1009
- ISSN
- 0021-9630 (ISSN-L)
- 1469-7610
- OpenAlex
- W2022906325
- Cited by
- 49
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 0.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Kazak, S., Collis, G. M., & Lewis, V. (1997). Can Young People with Autism Refer to Knowledge States? Evidence from Their Understanding of “Know” and “Guess”. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-7610.1997.tb01617.x
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