The DOI matches its Crossref record; 47 of the 47 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Who gets what in coalition governments? Predictors of portfolio allocation in parliamentary democracies
Abstract
Ministerial portfolios are the most obvious payoffs for parties entering a governing coalition in parliamentary democracies. This renders the bargaining over portfolios an important phase of the government formation process. The question of ‘who gets what, and why?’ in terms of ministerial remits has not yet received much attention by coalition or party scholars. This article focuses on this qualitative aspect of portfolio allocation and uses a new comparative dataset to evaluate a number of hypotheses that can be drawn from the literature. The main hypothesis is that parties which, in their election manifestos, emphasise themes corresponding to the policy remit of specific cabinet portfolios are more likely to obtain control over these portfolios. The results show that policy saliency is indeed an important predictor of portfolio allocation in postwar Western European parliamentary democracies.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
An Economic Theory of Democracy.
Banfield, E. C., & Downs, A. (1958) · Midwest Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2109186 · Cited by 18,594
Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior
McFadden, D. L. (1972) · eScholarship (California Digital Library) · Cited by 14,203
Multilevel analysis : an introduction to basic and advanced multilevel modeling
Snijders, T. A. B., & Bosker, R. (1999) · Cited by 13,786
Cragg, J. G., & Zarembka, P. (1975) · The Canadian Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/134075 · Cited by 8,342
Multilevel analysis techniques and applications
Hox, J. J., Moerbeek, M., & van de Schoot, R. (2002) · Cited by 6,728
Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses
Brambor, T., Clark, W. R., & Golder, M. (2006) · Political Analysis · doi:10.1093/pan/mpi014 · Cited by 6,223
Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work
Tsebelis, G. (2002) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400831456 · Cited by 3,482
Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work
Giné, V. L., & Tsebelis, G. (2003) · Reis · doi:10.2307/40184562 · Cited by 3,359
The measurement of urban travel demand
McFadden, D. (1974) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(74)90003-6 · Cited by 2,546
Hox, J., Moerbeek, M., & van de Schoot, R. (2002) · doi:10.4324/9781410604118 · Cited by 2,419
Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945-1998
Budge, I., Klingemann, H., Volkens, A., Bara, J. L., & Tanenbaum, E. (2001) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,508
Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies
(1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625671 · Cited by 1,395
Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts Using Words as Data
LAVER, M., BENOIT, K., & GARRY, J. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000698 · Cited by 1,377
Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945—1998
Budge, I., Klingemann, H.-D., Volkens, A., Bara, J., Tanenbaum, E., Fording, R. C., Hearl, D. J., Kim, H. M., Mcdonald, M. D., & Mendes, S. M. (2001) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199244003.001.0001 · Cited by 1,260
A theory of coalition formation
Gamson, W. A. (1961) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2090664 · Cited by 1,070
‘Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies'
(2017) · Political Accountability · doi:10.4324/9781315246567-15 · Cited by 1,002
Multiparty government: The politics of coalition in Europe
(1991) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/0261-3794(91)90033-o · Cited by 966
Laver, M., & Hunt, W. B. (1992) · Cited by 940
Minority government and majority rule
DeLue, S. M. (1991) · History of European Ideas · doi:10.1016/0191-6599(91)90164-t · Cited by 918
Parties, policies, and democracy
(1995) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.32-6464 · Cited by 917
Klingemann, H. (2006) · Cited by 772
A Scaling Model for Estimating Time‐Series Party Positions from Texts
Slapin, J. B., & Proksch, S. (2008) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00338.x · Cited by 684
Multiparty government: the politics of coalition in Europe
(1991) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.28-6457 · Cited by 627
Klingemann, H.-D., Volkens, A., Bara, J. L., Budge, I., & McDonald, M. D. (2006) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199296316.001.0001 · Cited by 622
Party Policy and Government Coalitions
(1992) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-22368-8 · Cited by 604
Mughan, A. (1991) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1963919 · Cited by 595
Katz, R., & Crotty, W. (2006) · SAGE Publications Ltd eBooks · doi:10.4135/9781848608047 · Cited by 574
THE PARTY FAMILY AND ITS STUDY
Mair, P., & Mudde, C. (1998) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.211 · Cited by 573
Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies
Martin, L. W., & Stevenson, R. T. (2001) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669358 · Cited by 536
Coalition governments in Western Europe
(2002) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.39-3035 · Cited by 453
Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies
Browne, E. C., & Franklin, M. N. (1973) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1958776 · Cited by 410
Treating Words as Data with Error: Uncertainty in Text Statements of Policy Positions
Benoit, K., Laver, M., & Mikhaylov, S. (2009) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00383.x · Cited by 356
Simulation-Extrapolation: The Measurement Error Jackknife
Stefanski, L. A., & Cook, J. R. (1995) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.1080/01621459.1995.10476629 · Cited by 327
WARWICK, P. V., & Druckman, J. N. (2006) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00632.x · Cited by 293
Parties and democracy: coalition formation and government functioning in twenty states
(1991) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.28-5308 · Cited by 241
The Logic of Gamson's Law: Pre‐election Coalitions and Portfolio Allocations
Carroll, R., & Cox, G. W. (2007) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00252.x · Cited by 213
Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments
Ansolabehere, S. D., Snyder, J. M., Strauss, A. B., & Ting, M. M. (2005) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00141.x · Cited by 189
The missing piece: Measuring portfolio salience in Western European parliamentary democracies
Druckman, J. N., & Warwick, P. V. (2005) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00217.x · Cited by 178
Coalition Government Membership in West European Parliamentary Democracies
Warwick, P. V. (1996) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123400007572 · Cited by 171
A partisan model of government expenditure
Bräuninger, T. (2005) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-005-3055-x · Cited by 146
Qualitative Dimensions of Coalition Payoffs: Evidence From European Party Governments, 1945-1970
Browne, E. C., & Feste, K. A. (1975) · American Behavioral Scientist · doi:10.1177/000276427501800406 · Cited by 102
Bäck, H., & Dumont, P. (2008) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-007-9267-5 · Cited by 98
Self-citationMeasuring government duration and stability in Central Eastern European democracies
Conrad, C. R., & Golder, S. (2009) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2009.01888.x · Cited by 82
Partisanship in the setting and coordination of fiscal and monetary policies
Cusack, T. R. (2001) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1023/a:1011839204612 · Cited by 69
Bäck, H., Meier, H. E., & Persson, T. (2009) · Journal of Legislative Studies · doi:10.1080/13572330802666760 · Cited by 55
Self-citationWhy so few, and why so late? Green parties and the question of governmental participation
Dumont, P., & Bäck, H. (2006) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00649.x · Cited by 44
Self-citationExperience and the distribution of portfolio payoffs in the European Commission
Franchino, F. (2008) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2008.00819.x · Cited by 17
Cited by
Which Issues do Parties Emphasise? Salience Strategies and Party Organisation in Multiparty Systems
Wagner, M., & Meyer, T. M. (2014) · West European Politics · doi:10.1080/01402382.2014.911483 · Cited by 293
Who Responds? Voters, Parties and Issue Attention
Klüver, H., & Spoon, J.-J. (2016) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123414000313 · Cited by 271
Metadata
- Authors
- Bäck, H., Debus, M., & Dumont, P.
- Venue
- European Journal of Political Research
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2011-06
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 441-478
- ISSN
- 0304-4130 (ISSN-L)
- 1475-6765
- OpenAlex
- W2158191507
- Cited by
- 315
- References
- 47
- FWCI
- 79.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.