The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
WHY OPEN-MINDED PEOPLE SHOULD ENDORSE DOGMATISM
Abstract
Open-minded people should endorse dogmatism because of its explanatory power. In more careful (but less catchy) words, the purpose of this paper is to provide a reason to accept dogmatism by showing how well it addresses four issues concerning non-inferential justification. In this context, dogmatism doesn’t pick out an attitude of stubborn adherence to some doctrine; rather, it is a view about non-inferential justification,1 the sort of justification a proposition has in any way except in virtue of the justification of another belief. Its basic idea is that certain experiences suffice for prima facie2 non-inferential justification.3 In this paper, we will focus on the following version: (Radical) Dogmatism: Necessarily, if it seems to S that P, then S thereby has prima facie (non-inferential) justification for P. ....
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McDowell, J. (1994) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,824
Pryor, J. (2000) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/0029-4624.00277 · Cited by 1,127
Plantinga, A. (1993) · doi:10.1093/0195078624.001.0001 · Cited by 995
Skepticism and the Veil of Perception
Huemer, M. (2001) · Rowman & Littlefield Publishers eBooks · doi:10.5040/9798216401605 · Cited by 768
Cohen, S. (1984) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/bf00372907 · Cited by 709
Conee, E., & Feldman, R. (2004) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199253722.001.0001 · Cited by 585
Justification without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism
Bergmann, M. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0199275742.001.0001 · Cited by 504
Epistemic justification: internalism vs. externalism, foundations vs. virtues
(2003) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.41-2097 · Cited by 339
Greco, J. (2000) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511527418 · Cited by 330
White, R. (2006) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-004-7487-9 · Cited by 263
Cited by
The Border Between Seeing and Thinking
Block, N. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.001.0001 · Cited by 367
Unconscious perceptual justification*
Berger, J., Nanay, B., & Quilty-Dunn, J. (2018) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2018.1432413 · Cited by 53
Metadata
- Authors
- Tucker, C.
- Venue
- Philosophical Perspectives
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2010-12
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 529-545
- ISSN
- 1520-8583 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1942367309
- Cited by
- 291
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 57.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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