The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Two Kinds of Unknowing
Abstract
Miranda Fricker claims that a “gap” in collective hermeneutical resources with respect to the social experiences of marginalized groups prevents members of those groups from understanding their own experiences (Fricker 2007). I argue that because Fricker misdescribes dominant hermeneutical resources as collective, she fails to locate the ethically bad epistemic practices that maintain gaps in dominant hermeneutical resources even while alternative interpretations are in fact offered by non-dominant discourses. Fricker's analysis of hermeneutical injustice does not account for the possibility that marginalized groups can be silenced relative to dominant discourses without being prevented from understanding or expressing their own social experiences. I suggest that a gap in dominant hermeneutical resources is ambiguous between two kinds of unknowing: hermeneutical injustice suffered by members of marginalized groups, and epistemically and ethically blameworthy ignorance perpetrated by members of dominant groups.
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“However, as is well documented, oppression does not necessarily stifle a community's capacity for making sense of their particular social experiences; marginalized groups are not doomed to perceive their experiences of oppression 'through a glass darkly'.”
From Agency and authority: A differentiated model of hermeneutical power (2025) · cites this paper as Mason 2011
In the citing paper
“Indeed, as others in the hermeneutical injustice literature are quick to point out, they often develop novel concepts and terms for articulating aspects of social life that dominant frameworks are ill-equipped to map (Mason 2011 ;Dotson 2012 ;Medina 2012Medina , 2013 ) ).”
From Agency and authority: A differentiated model of hermeneutical power (2025) · cites this paper as Mason 2011
Citations
Cites
Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing
Fricker, M. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001 · Cited by 9,198
Multiculturalism and the politics of recognition
Landesman, B. M. (1992) · Cited by 2,902
Mills, C. W. (2019) · Cornell University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781501764301 · Cited by 1,318
Categorically unequal: the American stratification system
(2008) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.45-4699 · Cited by 900
Blackness visible: essays on philosophy and race
(1999) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.36-5615 · Cited by 751
The Speculum of Ignorance: The Women's Health Movement and Epistemologies of Ignorance
Tuana, N. (2006) · Hypatia · doi:10.1111/j.1527-2001.2006.tb01110.x · Cited by 536
Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance
Medina, J. (2008) · The Journal of Speculative Philosophy · doi:10.2307/jspecphil.22.4.0313 · Cited by 421
In our time : memoir of a revolution
Brownmiller, S. (1999) · Cited by 414
The Speculum of Ignorance: The Women's Health Movement and Epistemologies of Ignorance
Tuana, N. (2006) · Hypatia · doi:10.1353/hyp.2006.0037 · Cited by 237
Powerlessness and Social Interpretation
Fricker, M. (2006) · Episteme · doi:10.3366/epi.2006.3.1-2.96 · Cited by 167
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression
Dotson, K. (2014) · Social Epistemology · doi:10.1080/02691728.2013.782585 · Cited by 1,232
Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
Anderson, E. (2012) · Social Epistemology · doi:10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 · Cited by 908
A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression
Dotson, K. (2012) · Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies · doi:10.1353/fro.2012.a472779 · Cited by 874
Epistemic Injustice and Illness
Kidd, I. J., & Carel, H. (2016) · Journal of Applied Philosophy · doi:10.1111/japp.12172 · Cited by 502
Evolving Concepts of Epistemic Injustice
Fricker, M. (2017) · The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice · doi:10.4324/9781315212043-5 · Cited by 515
Metadata
- Authors
- Mason, R.
- Corresponding author
- Mason, Rebecca
- ORCID
- Mason, Rebecca
- Venue
- Hypatia
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2011
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 294-307
- ISSN
- 0887-5367 (ISSN-L)
- 1527-2001
- OpenAlex
- W2129213993
- Cited by
- 265
- References
- 13
- Citations by year
- 2026: 58 · 2025: 32 · 2024: 35 · 2023: 21 · 2022: 38 · 2021: 19 · 2020: 17 · 2019: 15 · 2018: 8 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 1 · 2012: 5
- FWCI
- 11.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Hypatia (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Hermeneutics and Narrative Identity
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- hermeneutical injustice, Miranda Fricker, marginalized communities, ignorance, epistemic injustice, epistemic ignorance, social experience, epistemic practices
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