Reputation, Trust, and Rebates: How Online Auction Markets Can Improve Their Feedback Mechanisms
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Reputation systems constitute an important institution, helping sustain trust in online auction markets. However, only half of buyers leave feedback after transactions, and nearly all feedback is positive. In this paper, I propose a mechanism whereby sellers can provide rebates (not necessarily in monetary form) to buyers contingent upon buyers' provision of reports. Using a game theoretical model, I show how the mechanism can increase unbiased reporting. There exists a pooling equilibrium where both good and bad sellers choose the rebate option, even though their true types are revealed through feedback. The mechanism also induces bad sellers to improve the quality of the contract.
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Citations
Cites
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653 · cited 1×
“An important reason for the success of online auction sites is that the use of an online feedback mechanism as a reputation system helps sustain trust in online markets.”
A survey of trust and reputation systems for online service provision
Jøsang, A., Ismail, R., & Boyd, C. (2007) · Decision Support Systems · doi:10.1016/j.dss.2005.05.019 · Cited by 3,330
Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations
Shapiro, C. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1881782 · Cited by 2,327
Resnick, P., Kuwabara, K., Zeckhauser, R., & Friedman, E. (2000) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/355112.355122 · Cited by 2,190 · cited 1×
“An important reason for the success of online auction sites is that the use of an online feedback mechanism as a reputation system helps sustain trust in online markets.”
Social Norms and Community Enforcement
Kandori, M. (1992) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297925 · Cited by 1,574
The value of reputation on eBay: A controlled experiment
Resnick, P., Zeckhauser, R., Swanson, J., & Lockwood, K. (2006) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-006-4309-2 · Cited by 1,118
How Valuable Is a Good Reputation? A Sample Selection Model of Internet Auctions
Livingston, J. A. (2005) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/0034653054638391 · Cited by 271 · cited 1×
“For example, there exists a market for reputation in which traders can manipulate their reputation scores by participating in the market on eBay as examined in Brown and Morgan (2006), 5 and abusing the reputation system through unfair rating and ballot stuffing.”
The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay
Cabral, L., & Hortacsu, A. (2004) · doi:10.3386/w10363 · Cited by 149
Reputation in Online Auctions: The Market for Trust
Brown, J., & Morgan, J. (2006) · California Management Review · doi:10.2307/41166371 · Cited by 113 · cited 1×
“For example, there exists a market for reputation in which traders can manipulate their reputation scores by participating in the market on eBay as examined in Brown and Morgan (2006), 5 and abusing the reputation system through unfair rating and ballot stuffing.”
Designing reputation mechanisms
Dellarocas, C., Dini, F., & Spagnolo, G. (2006) · Handbook of Procurement · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511492556.019 · Cited by 44
Cited by
Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets
Tadelis, S. (2016) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015325 · Cited by 524
Are network effects really all about size? The role of structure and conduct
Afuah, A. (2013) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2013 · Cited by 268
(2012) · Cited by 100
Money Talks: Rebate Mechanisms in Reputation System Design
Li, L. (., & Xiao, E. (2014) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2013.1848 · Cited by 65
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Li, L. (.
- Venue
- Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2010-05-13
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 303-331
- ISSN
- 1058-6407 (ISSN-L)
- 1530-9134
- OpenAlex
- W3122467882
- Cited by
- 50
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 9.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Reputation, Trust, and Rebates: How Online Auction Markets Can Improve Their Feedback Mechanisms. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2010.00253.x
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- Li, L. (. (2010). Reputation, Trust, and Rebates: How Online Auction Markets Can Improve Their Feedback Mechanisms. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2010.00253.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.