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Reputation, Trust, and Rebates: How Online Auction Markets Can Improve Their Feedback Mechanisms

Li, Lingfang (Ivy) · 2010 · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Cited by 50

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Reputation systems constitute an important institution, helping sustain trust in online auction markets. However, only half of buyers leave feedback after transactions, and nearly all feedback is positive. In this paper, I propose a mechanism whereby sellers can provide rebates (not necessarily in monetary form) to buyers contingent upon buyers' provision of reports. Using a game theoretical model, I show how the mechanism can increase unbiased reporting. There exists a pooling equilibrium where both good and bad sellers choose the rebate option, even though their true types are revealed through feedback. The mechanism also induces bad sellers to improve the quality of the contract.

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Metadata

Authors
Li, L. (.
Venue
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2010-05-13
Volume
19
Issue
2
Pages
303-331
ISSN
  • 1058-6407 (ISSN-L)
  • 1530-9134
OpenAlex
W3122467882
Cited by
50
References
11
FWCI
9.16
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Reputation, Trust, and Rebates: How Online Auction Markets Can Improve Their Feedback Mechanisms. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2010.00253.x
The paper
Li, L. (. (2010). Reputation, Trust, and Rebates: How Online Auction Markets Can Improve Their Feedback Mechanisms. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2010.00253.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.