The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Credit Reporting, Relationship Banking, and Loan Repayment
Abstract
How does information sharing between lenders affect borrowers repayment behavior? We show—in a laboratory credit market—that information sharing increases repayment rates, as borrowers anticipate that a good credit record improves their access to credit. This incentive effect of information sharing is substantial when repayment is not third‐party enforceable and lending is dominated by one‐shot transactions. If, however, repeat interaction between borrowers and lenders is feasible, the incentive effect of credit reporting is negligible, as bilateral banking relationships discipline borrowers. Information sharing nevertheless affects market outcome by weakening lenders' ability to extract rents from relationships.
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Cites
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8v12ft1 · Cited by 12,769
Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1995.1027 · Cited by 5,548
The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data
PETERSEN, M. A., & RAJAN, R. G. (1994) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb04418.x · Cited by 5,440
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911307 · Cited by 2,395
Moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market game
Boot, A. W. A., & Thakor, A. V. (1994) · International Economic Review · doi:10.2307/2527003 · Cited by 827
New Developments in Econometric Methods for Labor Market Analysis
(1999) · Handbook of Labor Economics · doi:10.1016/s1573-4463(99)03005-9 · Cited by 152
Cited by
Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities
Gibbons, R., & Henderson, R. (2012) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1110.0715 · Cited by 537
Running for the Exit? International Bank Lending During a Financial Crisis
De Haas, R., & Van Horen, N. (2013) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhs113 · Cited by 478
Information sharing and credit: Firm-level evidence from transition countries
Brown, M., Jappelli, T., & Pagano, M. (2009) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2008.04.002 · Cited by 390
Self-citationA Behavioral Account of the Labor Market: The Role of Fairness Concerns
Fehr, E., Goette, L., & Zehnder, C. (2009) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.143217 · Cited by 303
Self-citationHow Bank Competition Affects Firms' Access to Finance
Love, I., & Martínez Pería, M. S. (2015) · The World Bank Economic Review · doi:10.1093/wber/lhu003 · Cited by 301
Metadata
- Authors
- BROWN, M., & ZEHNDER, C.
- Venue
- Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2007-11-20
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 1883-1918
- ISSN
- 0022-2879
- 1538-4616
- OpenAlex
- W3125703888
- Cited by
- 193
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 12.99
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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