The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Institutions of the Offensive: Domestic Sources of Dispute Initiation in Authoritarian Regimes, 1950–1992
Abstract
What are the most important sources of institutional variation among authoritarian regimes, and how do such institutions influence these dictatorships' propensity to initiate military disputes? This article argues that most existing studies in both comparative politics and international relations employ a flawed conceptualization of authoritarian institutions. Excessive focus on the personalization or institutionalization of authoritarian regimes' decision‐making procedures has distracted attention from the more critical issue of what institutions these regimes deploy to enhance social control and secure political incumbency. Since military regimes are systematically less effective than single‐party regimes at developing these types of authoritarian institutions, they more frequently resort to desperate measures to fend off domestic challenges to their power. In particular, we find compelling empirical support for our hypothesis that military regimes are more likely than single‐party regimes to initiate military disputes, irrespective of whether those regimes are highly personalized or not.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
What To Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data
Beck, N., & Katz, J. N. (1995) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082979 · Cited by 6,840
The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217 · cited 2×
“…process for removing a government from power, forcing decision makers to analyze how their actions are likely to affect their tenure, leading to a significantly decreased likelihood of conflict between democracies (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Gaubatz 1991).”
BackgroundResultWhat Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?
Geddes, B. (1999) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.115 · Cited by 2,025
Cited by
The Politics of Authoritarian Rule
Svolik, M. W. (2012) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139176040 · Cited by 2,611
Democracy and dictatorship revisited
Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J., & Vreeland, J. R. (2010) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9491-2 · Cited by 2,481
Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political Leaders
Goemans, H. E., Gleditsch, K. S., & Chiozza, G. (2009) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343308100719 · Cited by 1,128
Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment
Wright, J. (2008) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00315.x · Cited by 708
Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict
WEEKS, J. L. (2012) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055412000111 · Cited by 513
Metadata
- Authors
- Lai, B., & Slater, D.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2005-12-20
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 113-126
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-5907
- OpenAlex
- W2077002000
- Cited by
- 249
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 20.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Institutions of the Offensive: Domestic Sources of Dispute Initiation in Authoritarian Regimes, 1950–1992. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00173.x
- The paper
- Lai, B., & Slater, D. (2006). Institutions of the Offensive: Domestic Sources of Dispute Initiation in Authoritarian Regimes, 1950–1992. American Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00173.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.