The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Political Costs of Crisis Bargaining: Presidential Rhetoric and the Role of Party
Abstract
We analyze the first large-scale, randomized experiment to measure presidential approval levels at all outcomes of a canonical international crisis-bargaining model, thereby avoiding problems of strategic selection in evaluating presidential incentives. We find support for several assumptions made in the crisis-bargaining literature, including that a concession from a foreign state leads to higher approval levels than other outcomes, that the magnitudes of audience costs are under presidential control prior to the initiation of hostilities, and that these costs can be made so large that presidents have incentive to fight wars they will not win. Thus, the credibility of democratic threats can be made extremely high. We also find, however, that partisan cues strongly condition presidential incentives. Party elites have incentives to behave according to type in Congress and contrary to type in the Oval Office, and Democratic presidents sometimes have incentives to fight wars they will not win.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion
Zaller, J. R. (1992) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511818691 · Cited by 7,785
The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217 · cited 1×
“…and crisis decision making include Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2009), Tomz (2007), Chiozza and Goemans (2003, 2004), Schultz (2005), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999, 2003), Mueller (1973), DeNardo (1995), Stam (1999), Berinsky (2009), Holsti (2004), James and Oneal (1991), Jentlesen (1992),…”
BackgroundRationalist explanations for war
Fearon, J. D. (1995) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300033324 · Cited by 3,995
Crossing the Water's Edge: Elite Rhetoric, Media Coverage, and the Rally-Round-the-Flag Phenomenon
Groeling, T., & Baum, M. A. (2008) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381608081061 · Cited by 243
Cited by
A Bottom‐Up Theory of Public Opinion about Foreign Policy
Kertzer, J. D., & Zeitzoff, T. (2017) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12314 · Cited by 443
Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace
TOMZ, M. R., & WEEKS, J. L. P. (2013) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055413000488 · Cited by 416
Mapping the Boundaries of Elite Cues: How Elites Shape Mass Opinion across International Issues
Guisinger, A., & Saunders, E. N. (2017) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isq/sqx022 · Cited by 331
Reputation and Status as Motives for War
Dafoe, A., Renshon, J., & Huth, P. (2014) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-071112-213421 · Cited by 322
Decomposing Audience Costs: Bringing the Audience Back into Audience Cost Theory
Kertzer, J. D., & Brutger, R. (2016) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12201 · Cited by 305
Metadata
- Authors
- Trager, R. F., & Vavreck, L.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2011-06-07
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 526-545
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2135959414
- Cited by
- 179
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 48.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Political Costs of Crisis Bargaining: Presidential Rhetoric and the Role of Party. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00521.x
- The paper
- Trager, R. F., & Vavreck, L. (2011). The Political Costs of Crisis Bargaining: Presidential Rhetoric and the Role of Party. American Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00521.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.