The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Initial Shareholdings and Overbidding in Takeover Contests
Abstract
Within the context of takeovers, this paper shows that in private‐value auctions the optimal individually rational strategy for a bidder with partial ownership of the item is to overbid, i.e., to bid more than his valuation. This strategy, however, can lead to i) an inefficient outcome, and ii) the winning bidder making a net loss. Further, the overbidding result implies that the presence of a large shareholder increases the bid premium in single‐bidder takeovers at the expense of reducing the probability of the takeover actually occurring.
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Citations
Cites
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261385 · Cited by 8,408
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911865 · Cited by 3,753
The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers
Roll, R. (1986) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296325 · Cited by 3,751
Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1980) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003400 · Cited by 3,098
Managerial control of voting rights
Stulz, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90039-6 · Cited by 2,429
Bradley, M., Desai, A., & Kim, E. H. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90030-x · Cited by 1,701
The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980
Jarrell, G. A., Brickley, J. A., & Netter, J. M. (1988) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.2.1.49 · Cited by 1,119
The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform
Aghion, P., Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1992) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w4097 · Cited by 569
The Evolution of Buyout Pricing and Financial Structure in the 1980s
Kaplan, S. N., & Stein, J. C. (1993) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118334 · Cited by 448
A Theory of Preemptive Takeover Bidding
Fishman, M. J. (1988) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555399 · Cited by 367
Cited by
Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm
Burkart, M., Gromb, D., & Panunzi, F. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555325 · Cited by 1,509
Self-citationCorporate Governance and Control
Becht, M., Bolton, P., & Röell, A. (2003) · Handbook of the Economics of Finance · doi:10.1016/s1574-0102(03)01005-7 · Cited by 795
Toeholds, Bid Jumps, and Expected Payoffs in Takeovers
Betton, S., & Eckbo, B. E. (2000) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/13.4.841 · Cited by 394
Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders
Burkart, M., Gromb, D., & Panunzi, F. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250006 · Cited by 354
Self-citationBidding strategies and takeover premiums: A review
Eckbo, B. E. (2009) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.09.016 · Cited by 306
Metadata
- Authors
- BURKART, M.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1995-12
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1491-1515
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2139849942
- Cited by
- 262
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 7.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.