The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous‐Time Agency Model
Abstract
We derive the optimal dynamic contract in a continuous‐time principal‐agent setting, and implement it with a capital structure (credit line, long‐term debt, and equity) over which the agent controls the payout policy. While the project's volatility and liquidation cost have little impact on the firm's total debt capacity, they increase the use of credit versus debt. Leverage is nonstationary, and declines with past profitability. The firm may hold a compensating cash balance while borrowing (at a higher rate) through the credit line. Surprisingly, the usual conflicts between debt and equity (asset substitution, strategic default) need not arise.
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Cites
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
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Optimal Capital Structure, Endogenous Bankruptcy, and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads
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Recursive Macroeconomic Theory
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A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital
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Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty*
Baker, S. R., Bloom, N., & Davis, S. J. (2016) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjw024 · Cited by 12,458
A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
SANNIKOV, Y. (2008) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00486.x · Cited by 716
Self-citationA Review of Empirical Capital Structure Research and Directions for the Future
Graham, J. R., & Leary, M. T. (2011) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-102710-144821 · Cited by 547
Wages and Human Capital in the U.S. Finance Industry: 1909–2006*
Philippon, T., & Reshef, A. (2012) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjs030 · Cited by 521
Optimal Long-Term Financial Contracting
DeMarzo, P. M., & Fishman, M. J. (2007) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhm031 · Cited by 431
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- DeMARZO, P. M., & SANNIKOV, Y.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2006-12
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 2681-2724
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2029130421
- Cited by
- 637
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 75.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.