The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Optimal Long-Term Financial Contracting
Abstract
We develop an agency model of financial contracting. We derive long-term debt, a line of credit, and equity as optimal securities, capturing the debt coupon and maturity; the interest rate and limits on the credit line; inside versus outside equity; dividend policy; and capital structure dynamics. The optimal debt-equity ratio is history dependent, but debt and credit line terms are independent of the amount financed and, in some cases, the severity of the agency problem. In our model, the agent can divert cash flows; we also consider settings in which the agent undertakes hidden effort, or can control cash flow risk.
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Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
Hart, O. (1995) · doi:10.1093/0198288816.001.0001 · Cited by 4,672
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
Townsend, R. M. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0 · Cited by 3,204
Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1998) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355398555496 · Cited by 1,020
A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt
Bulow, J., & Rogoff, K. (1989) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261596 · Cited by 991
On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
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Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous‐Time Agency Model
DeMARZO, P. M., & SANNIKOV, Y. (2006) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01002.x · Cited by 637
Self-citationOptimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution
Mookherjee, D., & Png, I. (1989) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937855 · Cited by 581
Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics
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Cited by
Human Capital, Bankruptcy, and Capital Structure
BERK, J. B., STANTON, R., & ZECHNER, J. (2010) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01556.x · Cited by 599
A Review of Empirical Capital Structure Research and Directions for the Future
Graham, J. R., & Leary, M. T. (2011) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-102710-144821 · Cited by 547
Collateral, Risk Management, and the Distribution of Debt Capacity
RAMPINI, A. A., & VISWANATHAN, S. (2010) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01616.x · Cited by 525
Gromb, D., & Vayanos, D. (2010) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-073009-104107 · Cited by 478
COLLA, P., IPPOLITO, F., & LI, K. (2013) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12052 · Cited by 409
Metadata
- Authors
- DeMarzo, P. M., & Fishman, M. J.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2007-09-07
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 2079-2128
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2170723386
- Cited by
- 431
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 66.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.