The DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bank Loans, Bonds, and Information Monopolies across the Business Cycle
Open accessAbstract
Theory suggests that banks' private information about borrowers lets them hold up borrowers for higher interest rates. Since hold‐up power increases with borrower risk, banks with exploitable information should be able to raise their rates in recessions by more than is justified by borrower risk alone. We test this hypothesis by comparing the pricing of loans for bank‐dependent borrowers with the pricing of loans for borrowers with access to public debt markets, controlling for risk factors. Loan spreads rise in recessions, but firms with public debt market access pay lower spreads and their spreads rise significantly less in recessions.
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Cites
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Cited by
Relationship and Transaction Lending in a Crisis
Bolton, P., Freixas, X., Gambacorta, L., & Mistrulli, P. E. (2016) · The Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhw041 · Cited by 617
Cyclicality of credit supply: Firm level evidence
Becker, B., & Ivashina, V. (2014) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2013.10.002 · Cited by 542
Bank Corporate Loan Pricing Following the Subprime Crisis
Santos, J. A. C. (2011) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhq115 · Cited by 392
Self-citationLending Relationships and Information Rents: Do Banks Exploit Their Information Advantages?
Schenone, C. (2010) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhp080 · Cited by 368
The Costs of Being Private: Evidence from the Loan Market
Saunders, A., & Steffen, S. (2011) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhr083 · Cited by 347
Metadata
- Authors
- SANTOS, J. A. C., & WINTON, A.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2008-05-09
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1315-1359
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W3124650934
- Cited by
- 388
- References
- 41
- FWCI
- 34.99
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- SANTOS, J. A. C., & WINTON, A. (2008). Bank Loans, Bonds, and Information Monopolies across the Business Cycle. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01359.x
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.