The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Agency Problems at Dual‐Class Companies
Abstract
Using a sample of U.S. dual‐class companies, we examine how divergence between insider voting and cash flow rights affects managerial extraction of private benefits of control. We find that as this divergence widens, corporate cash holdings are worth less to outside shareholders, CEOs receive higher compensation, managers make shareholder value‐destroying acquisitions more often, and capital expenditures contribute less to shareholder value. These findings support the agency hypothesis that managers with greater excess control rights over cash flow rights are more prone to pursue private benefits at shareholders’ expense, and help explain why firm value is decreasing in insider excess control rights.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error
Heckman, J. J. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912352 · Cited by 28,779
Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(84)90023-0 · Cited by 18,957
Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have
Myers, S., & Majluf, N. (1984) · doi:10.3386/w1396 · Cited by 6,745
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
Jensen (Deceased), M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1998) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.94043 · Cited by 2,749
Managerial control of voting rights
Stulz, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90039-6 · Cited by 2,429
Cited by
The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Firm Value: The Role of Customer Awareness
Servaes, H., & Tamayo, A. (2013) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1120.1630 · Cited by 2,534
Do analysts matter for governance? Evidence from natural experiments
Chen, T., Harford, J., & Lin, C. (2015) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.10.002 · Cited by 747
Masulis, R. W., Pham, P. K., & Zein, J. (2011) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhr052 · Cited by 523
Self-citationDual Class Ownership and Tax Avoidance
McGuire, S. T., Wang, D., & Wilson, R. J. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1761994 · Cited by 341
Cui, L., Meyer, K. E., & Hu, H. W. (2014) · Journal of World Business · doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2013.12.003 · Cited by 332
Metadata
- Authors
- MASULIS, R. W., WANG, C., & XIE, F.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2009-07-16
- Volume
- 64
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1697-1727
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W3121881345
- Cited by
- 605
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 116.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Agency Problems at Dual‐Class Companies. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01477.x
- The paper
- MASULIS, R. W., WANG, C., & XIE, F. (2009). Agency Problems at Dual‐Class Companies. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01477.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
