The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance
Open accessAbstract
Public policy discussions typically favor greater corporate disclosure as a way to reduce firms' agency problems. This argument is incomplete because it overlooks that better disclosure regimes can also aggravate agency problems and related costs, including executive compensation. Consequently, a point can exist beyond which additional disclosure decreases firm value. Holding all else equal, we further show that larger firms will adopt stricter disclosure rules than smaller firms and firms with better disclosure will employ more able management. We show that mandated increases in disclosure could, in part, explain recent increases in both CEO compensation and CEO turnover rates.
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Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
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Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. (2005) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2005.01.002 · Cited by 6,316
Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital
DIAMOND, D. W., & VERRECCHIA, R. E. (1991) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04620.x · Cited by 3,836
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
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Cross-Sectional Determinants of Analyst Ratings of Corporate Disclosures
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The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure
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Stochastic orders and their applications
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Cited by
LEUZ, C., & WYSOCKI, P. D. (2016) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12115 · Cited by 1,760
Do environmental, social, and governance activities improve corporate financial performance?
Xie, J., Nozawa, W., Yagi, M., Fujii, H., & Managi, S. (2019) · Business Strategy and the Environment · doi:10.1002/bse.2224 · Cited by 1,072
Product market power, industry structure, and corporate earnings management
Datta, S., Iskandar-Datta, M., & Singh, V. (2013) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.03.012 · Cited by 285
Donaldson, T., & Walsh, J. P. (2015) · Research in Organizational Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.riob.2015.10.002 · Cited by 283
Wu, Y., Lee, C.-C., Lee, C.-C., & Peng, D. (2022) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2022.106510 · Cited by 268
Metadata
- Authors
- HERMALIN, B. E., & WEISBACH, M. S.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2012-01-17
- Volume
- 67
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 195-233
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W4246717364
- Cited by
- 566
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 89.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
