The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Board Composition, Managerial Ownership, and Firm Performance: An Empirical Analysis
Open accessAbstract
Our objective is to examine the sensitivity of simultaneous equations techniques in corporate governance research. We model Tobin's Q, board composition, and managerial ownership using a three‐equation instrumental variables approach, with two specifications and four instruments. We find that the variables are jointly determined. However, results depend strongly on the specification of the model and the instruments. We conclude that results using simultaneous equations methods must be interpreted cautiously, OLS estimates should not be casually dismissed, and that sensitivity analysis is essential when estimating an empirical model whose structure is uncertain.
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Citations
Cites
Management ownership and market valuation
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90048-7 · Cited by 6,895
Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors
Yermack, D. (1996) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(95)00844-5 · Cited by 6,603
The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences
Demsetz, H., & Lehn, K. (1985) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261354 · Cited by 6,236
Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value
McConnell, J. J., & Servaes, H. (1990) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(90)90069-c · Cited by 4,309
Outside directors and CEO turnover
Weisbach, M. S. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90053-0 · Cited by 4,234
Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders
Agrawal, A., & Knoeber, C. R. (1996) · The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/2331397 · Cited by 2,801
A Simple Approximation of Tobin's q
Chung, K. H., & Pruitt, S. W. (1994) · Financial Management · doi:10.2307/3665623 · Cited by 2,460
Managerial control of voting rights
Stulz, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90039-6 · Cited by 2,429
The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1991) · Financial Management · doi:10.2307/3665716 · Cited by 2,309
Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition
(1985) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036883 · Cited by 1,736
Cited by
Professors in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance
Francis, B., Hasan, I., & Wu, Q. (2015) · Financial Management · doi:10.1111/fima.12069 · Cited by 328
Appuhami, R., & Bhuyan, M. (2015) · Managerial Auditing Journal · doi:10.1108/maj-04-2014-1022 · Cited by 100
Metadata
- Authors
- Barnhart, S. W., & Rosenstein, S.
- Venue
- Financial Review
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1998-11
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1-16
- ISSN
- 0732-8516 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6288
- OpenAlex
- W2054817230
- Cited by
- 473
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 5.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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