THE MONOPOLY OF VIOLENCE: EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 36 of the 36 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Many states in Latin America, Africa, and Asia lack the monopoly of violence, even though this was identified by Max Weber as the foundation of the state, and thus the capacity to govern effectively. In this paper we develop a new perspective on the establishment of the monopoly of violence. We build a model to explain the incentive of central states to eliminate nonstate armed actors (paramilitaries) in a democracy. The model is premised on the idea that paramilitaries may choose to and can influence elections. Since paramilitaries have preferences over policies, this reduces the incentives of the politicians they favor to eliminate them. We then investigate these ideas using data from Colombia between 1991 and 2006. We first present regression and case study evidence supporting our postulate that paramilitary groups can have significant effects on elections for the legislature and the executive. Next, we show that the evidence is also broadly consistent with the implication of the model that paramilitaries tend to persist to the extent that they deliver votes to candidates for the executive whose preferences are close to theirs and that this effect is larger in areas where the presidential candidate would have otherwise not done as well. Finally, we use roll-call votes to illustrate a possible “quid pro quo” between the executive and paramilitaries in Colombia.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. A., & Santos, R. J.
- Venue
- Journal of the European Economic Association
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2013-01
- Volume
- 11
- Pages
- 5-44
- ISSN
- 1542-4766 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2119884887
- Cited by
- 439
- References
- 36
- FWCI
- 84.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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