The Feasibility of Folk Science
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
If folk science means individuals having well worked out mechanistic theories of the workings of the world, then it is not feasible. Laypeople’s explanatory understandings are remarkably coarse, full of gaps, and often full of inconsistencies. Even worse, most people overestimate their own understandings. Yet recent views suggest that formal scientists may not be so different. In spite of these limitations, science somehow works and its success offers hope for the feasibility of folk science as well. The success of science arises from the ways in which scientists learn to leverage understandings in other minds and to outsource explanatory work through sophisticated methods of deference and simplification of complex systems. Three studies ask whether analogous processes might be present not only in laypeople but also in young children and thereby form a foundation for supplementing explanatory understandings almost from the start of our first attempts to make sense of the world.
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Citations
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“However they are construed, framework theories alone will not suffice as a basis for a folk science, and indeed they have often been presented as requiring an accompanying specific intuitive theory (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992).”
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“In short, there seems to be an emerging consensus about the existence of many folk sciences across all cultures that lead both to real successes at understanding the world and to misconceptions.”
Background
Cited by
Motivated numeracy and enlightened self-government
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The Public's Bounded Understanding of Science
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“1 Mental models are seen as a functional blueprint of how a user thinks a system works [36, 39], while folk theories are less formal, less mechanistic, and more expansive, representing guiding beliefs about a whole system [23, 24].”
Influential
Metadata
- Authors
- Keil, F. C.
- Venue
- Cognitive Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2010-07
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 826-862
- ISSN
- 0364-0213 (ISSN-L)
- 1551-6709
- OpenAlex
- W2145831741
- Cited by
- 94
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 12.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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