The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Family Firm Performance: Further Evidence
Abstract
This article empirically investigates the competitiveness and stability of family-owned firms relative to firms owned by diverse shareholders. Founding families are present in about one-third of the S&P 500—the sample of this study. Data gathered over the 1992—2002 period confirm that family firms tend to experience higher employment and revenue growth over time and are more profitable. Regression analysis also supports that firm performance improves when founding family members are involved in management. Although evidence on the relative stability in employment among family firms over the long run is tenuous, data from the most recent recession support the role that founding families play in maintaining employment stability during temporary market downturns.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Kraus, S., Clauss, T., Breier, M., Gast, J., Zardini, A., & Tiberius, V. (2020) · International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behavior & Research · doi:10.1108/ijebr-04-2020-0214 · Cited by 824
Lumpkin, G. T., Brigham, K. H., & Moss, T. W. (2010) · Entrepreneurship & Regional Development · doi:10.1080/08985621003726218 · Cited by 641
Stewart, A., & Hitt, M. A. (2012) · Family Business Review · doi:10.1177/0894486511421665 · Cited by 593
Family Ownership, Board Independence, and R&D Investment
Chen, H.-L., & Hsu, W.-T. (2009) · Family Business Review · doi:10.1177/0894486509341062 · Cited by 533
Minichilli, A., Corbetta, G., & MacMillan, I. C. (2010) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2009.00888.x · Cited by 513
Metadata
- Authors
- Lee, J.
- Venue
- Family Business Review
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2006-06
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 103-114
- ISSN
- 0894-4865 (ISSN-L)
- 1741-6248
- OpenAlex
- W2165332888
- Cited by
- 524
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 21.78
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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