The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Information Asymmetries and Consumption Decisions in Organic Food Product Markets
Abstract
Organic agriculture is a rapidly growing segment of most developed agricultural economies around the world. To stimulate growth and circumvent supply‐side market failures that emerge when organic products are not segregated, governments have introduced regulations concerning the certification and labeling of organic food. While certification and labeling satisfy market demand for information provision, the introduction of these activities creates incentives for the mislabeling of conventional food as organic. Despite the incentives for, and the incidence of, mislabeling in organic food product markets, this issue has not been analyzed systematically. In fact, the possibility of mislabeling has been customarily neglected by economic studies of markets for credence goods in general. This paper addresses the issue of product type misrepresentation in organic food product markets and develops a model of heterogeneous consumers that examines the effect of mislabeling on consumer purchasing decisions and welfare. Analytical results show that, contrary to what is traditionally believed, while certification and labeling are necessary, they are not sufficient for alleviating failures in organic food product markets. The effectiveness of labeling depends on the level of product type misrepresentation. Consumer deception through mislabeling affects consumer trust in the labeling process and can have detrimental consequences for the market acceptance of organic products. When extensive mislabeling occurs, the value of labeling is undermined and the organic food market fails. L'agriculture biologique est un secteur qui prend rapidement de l'expansion dans la plupart des pays agricoles industrialisés. Pour stimuler la croissance de ce secteur et éviter les problèmes d'offre qui surviennent quand il n'y a pas ségrégation des denrées, les gouvernements ont adopté des règlements sur la certification et l'étiquetage des produits biologiques. Même s'ils satisfont la demande d'informations sur le marché, la certification et l'étiquetage ouvrent la porte à l'usage abusif du terme “biologique” sur l'étiquette des denrées ordinaires. Or, bien que les producteurs soient tentés d'utiliser le terme à tort et à travers et en dépit des incidences d'un tel comportement, le phénomène n'a jamais été analysé de manière méthodique. De fait, les analyses économiques sur le marché des denrées alimentaires, en général, négligent souvent la possibilité de fausses déclarations sur l'étiquette des produits. L'article que voici aborde ce problème sur le marché des aliments biologiques et propose un modèle qui tient compte des effets d'un étiquetage fallacieux sur les achats et le bien‐être de consommateurs hétérogènes. Les résultats de l'analyse indiquent que, contrairement à ce qu'on croit, la certification et l'étiquetage, bien que nécessaires, ne suffisent pas à atténuer les problèmes observés sur le marché des aliments biologiques. En effet, l'efficacité de l'étiquetage dépend du nombre de fausses déclarations. La déception qui résulte d'une fausse déclaration ébranle la confiance des consommateurs dans le système d'étiquetage, si bien que les produits biologiques sont mal accueillis sur le marché. Quand les fausses déclarations se multiplient, l'étiquette perd sa valeur et il devient impossible de commercialiser les denrées biologiques.
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Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Free competition and the optimal amount of fraud
Darby, M. R., & Karni, E. (1973) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466756 · Cited by 3,947
Mussa, M., & Rosen, S. (1978) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(78)90085-6 · Cited by 3,306
Cited by
Yiridoe, E. K., Bonti-Ankomah, S., & Martin, R. C. (2005) · Renewable Agriculture and Food Systems · doi:10.1079/raf2005113 · Cited by 753
Nuttavuthisit, K., & Thøgersen, J. (2017) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-015-2690-5 · Cited by 722
The Reliability of Certification: Quality Labels as a Consumer Policy Tool
Jahn, G., Schramm, M., & Spiller, A. (2005) · Journal of Consumer Policy · doi:10.1007/s10603-004-7298-6 · Cited by 431
Sun, Y., Luo, B., Wang, S., & Fang, W. (2021) · Business Strategy and the Environment · doi:10.1002/bse.2648 · Cited by 264
Teng, C.-C., & Lu, C.-H. (2016) · Appetite · doi:10.1016/j.appet.2016.05.006 · Cited by 255
Metadata
- Authors
- Giannakas, K.
- Venue
- Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2002-03
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 35-50
- ISSN
- 0008-3976 (ISSN-L)
- 1744-7976
- OpenAlex
- W2127142370
- Cited by
- 227
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 4.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Giannakas, K. (2002). Information Asymmetries and Consumption Decisions in Organic Food Product Markets. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-7976.2002.tb00380.x
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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