The Determinants of Corruption: Cross‐Country‐Panel‐Data Analysis
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This study explores the determinants of corruption, utilizing the H ausman and T aylor's technique to estimate a random effects model that incorporates both the effects of corruption determinants that vary over time and those that are time‐invariant, and using a larger panel dataset and a comprehensive set of corruption determinants. The first interesting result is that perception of strong support for rule of law is strongly correlated with reduced corruption, suggesting that a better quality of law enforcement reduces corruption. Rich countries have lower corruption, and the perception of free expression and accountability strongly decreases corruption, indicating that providing greater opportunities for citizens to participate in selecting their government, more freedom of expression, and free media are effective ways of curbing corruption. Conversely, natural resource abundance, country population size, country's dominant religious tradition, ethnic fractionalization, and political stability are unimportant determinants of corruption, while previous research has suggested they are important.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Econometric Analysis of Panel Data
Baltagi, B. H. (2021) · Springer Texts in Business and Economics · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-53953-5 · Cited by 15,104
Mauro, P. (1995) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2946696 · Cited by 8,820
La Porta, R. (1999) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/15.1.222 · Cited by 5,699
Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S., & Wacziarg, R. (2003) · Journal of Economic Growth · doi:10.1023/a:1024471506938 · Cited by 3,432
Panel data and unobservable individual effects
Hausman, J., & Taylor, W. (1981) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/0304-4076(81)90085-3 · Cited by 2,309
Rents, Competition, and Corruption
Ades, A., & Di Tella, R. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.982 · Cited by 1,763
Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption, and Economic Growth
Leite, C., & Weidmann, J. (1999) · IMF Working Papers · doi:10.5089/9781451850734.001 · Cited by 604
Cited by
E-Government, Internet Adoption, and Corruption: An Empirical Investigation
Elbahnasawy, N. G. (2014) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.12.005 · Cited by 342
Self-citationE-Government and Corruption: A Longitudinal Analysis of Countries
Zhao, X., & Xu, H. D. (2015) · International Journal of Public Administration · doi:10.1080/01900692.2014.942736 · Cited by 79
“…authors have suggested that the level of economic development, mostly indicated by per capita gross domestic product (GDP), exerts an influence on corruption (Chang & Golden, 2007; Elbahnasawy & Revier, 2012; Fisman & Gatti, 2002; Serra, 2006; Swamy, Knack, Lee, & Azfar, 2001; Treisman, 2000).”
BackgroundMethodInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Elbahnasawy, N. G., & Revier, C. F.
- Venue
- The Developing Economies
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2012-11-19
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 311-333
- ISSN
- 0012-1533 (ISSN-L)
- 1746-1049
- OpenAlex
- W1585170770
- Cited by
- 164
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 11.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.